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AItre comnlttee on Budgcta hereby rubmitr to the European Parliancnt thc
followlng notion f,or a reeolutlonr togcther uith Gxplanatory staten€ntr
uoTroN FoR A RESOIITITON
on ttrc Community's ct n r€loureea
@,
- having regard to the Ireaty e8tabli.hing the European Econonic comnunity,
and in p.rticular to Article 201,
- havlng regard to the Treaty establkhing the EAEC, and in partlcular to
Articlc 1?3,
- having rcglrd to tlrs Trcaty artabli.hing the ECSC, and in partiGutrrr-to
Article 49,,
'- having regard to the conmunication fron the Conmieaion to thc Couneil and
the European Parlian€nt on 'Financlng tlre Cornunity'a budgetr tlrr ray ahced,
(co&r(78) 531 fln.),
- havtng regard to th€ report of the Connittee on Budg.ts (Doe. L-712/gOl,
. 
(a) t{herear the Cormrunity'e general budget for 1980 amounted to
' 15,583 m EUA, in paynrent approprlations r€pretcnting O.B0* of the
Comnunity's total @P, 2..6% of the tiember StateF, total budget5,
of whlch 73.2% wae utilized for expenditure under Ore EAGGT.
Guarantee Section, 14.1% for expeqditure on atructures, 3.9?6 for
operational expendLture, and 3.9% for expenditure on coopcratlon
wtth developing countries ;
(b) Whereas, apart from the generll budget, tjre community war reaponslble
in 1980 for the nanagcment ofr
: - Ecsc exPendlture. fron a lnraflacal lcvy, anountlng to I13 m.EIAi
- borroqring and lending opcratlons on tlre capltal nark tB (ECSC,
' Euratom, NCtr (1979), community Loan! (19270, anountl,ng to 3,rr5 m Eta;
- the European Development 8und, f,ron contrtbutiong from the lrhmlcer
states, amounting to 300 n EIIA;
thaE, Le, an overall flnaneial volune for 19gO of 3,529 m EIIA,
or 22.5% of the EEc budget;
-5- p85.1.634/tln.
I,l
Whergrr in 1980 the financing of the'geaeral budget brokc dqrn at folloqp:
- agricultural levlee and augar contributiont, 14.I% of onn reaou3c.r,
amounting Eo 21223.7 m Eth;
- 
(:uitom$ rlrrtton, ttr.1.1., amOunting to 5,667 m EIA;
- VAtltr 4rt.(t');,, .rnrountittg to 71 15I m EUA,
- miaecllan oua revonuc!, 496, anounting to G4o.5 m EUAi
(d) whereas the yield fron vAT ie restrictcd by the r% ceilinq on th€
ratc on tax bar. applled by the ttGob€r Stat€r I llrat tJre ylcld frm cuatonr
' dutlec, lrGeaute of, the tarlff reductiona under GAT!, sill be growing at aprogretalvcly decrcteing rate i and, Iaotly that thc y{cld fro8l rgrteultuFal
leviel, while it sill fluetuate, rrill rcuain only a d.nor fractlon of own'
rctourc€8 i(c) whereaa borrowi.ng and rendlng operationB, 
-arthough they nuat'be'
cxpanded, will neceraarlly bc eubjact to llnltations,(f) whoroaa, therrtforo, tlto c:etLtng on crhrn reaourees avai6ble at proient
to the community wi.[t vcr:y pr:ohp51, lxr roaelrocl in tlro tqgl budgot,
and lt wilr aeeordinory be neeeeaary to find new qrn rc,.ource! toonin order to avold ! ,rcturn to the system of national contributions,(g) llhereag the alteration of the ceiling on cnn rseources ie condltional
on a more rltioBal and more economical restructuring of the comunl.ty
)\
(c)
budget;
t. Approves the conclusions and the
Commlttee on Budg€ta, which are
i
recornnilndations subnitted by the
containcd in tbe ensufug ;nragraphe r
r. !!e_siss-eg_lE:_gesBesilr_Esgseg
2. Reaffirms ite convi.ction, expresFed on a number of oceaaions. that itis urgently necrrsaary to bring agriculturar por.icy cxpenditure under
control in order to end *re ,uncontrorled grtrt' of rpcndr.ng undcr thisheading and the creation of eurpluaes, end in order to allorr a.mor6
equltabre di8tribution of, financial resourcea betrren th€ varlou.
Community policiee;
3. calrs the attention of pubric opinion, of the.t[er&cr gtrta!, enf of elrt-ltc community iristitutione to the fact that the c@hunlty wltr hlve to
extend the sphcre of its reaponaiblr.itlcc and qstume ncs trcke andthat the size of ita budget must therafore bc rnereaeed;
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4: Conflrmg thc eonclusiong of the MacDo'iJaII report, and in thcir light
formg the opinion that Comrnunity structural and short-term economl,c
cxpcnditure wiIL only have a eignificant influenee if it account. for
. 
a conalderabry higher percentage of the comrnunity,E g.roi. domttic
product;
5. Bt'lieves that, as a rule, sueh increaseg should proeeed in atep witl
tlrc progregsive transfer of reaponeiLilities and wouId, therefore,
involvo tlte transfer of resourcea by the f,bnrber Statcs to the coflnunlty,
' without thereby increasing tlre overarl. burden on thc taxpaysrr,
Irr. gligr-3lg-segEEeleteiyeses,g_eg_tEe-Eelseg
6. RGGaIIE that Article 199 EEc and Article 171 EAEC havq ertabltehcd the
. 
prlnciples of the unlty (eipenditure and revenu€ muct br in balancc)
and the comprehenaivenees (alI rcvenue and aII expcndlture Burt ba
enteretl iI aI: t>udqet) of tlro r.lommuniLy burlr;ert;
l; Dr.-'Plores the t.l('L Llrat until trrday reaortrcc! deriving from borroing and
those intended for the European Developncnt Fund renain outa1de the budgot,
and that, absurdly, some revenuea are eonsidered as negativ€ extrcnditure;
and requelts that both these aituatione be ended aa aoon ae poreible;
8. rs of the opinion that parafiecar chargea can be tolGrated onry
exceptionally but ehould, in any 
€v!nt, bG entcrGd in tbc budtict r6venu.,
9. Congidera that the ECSC budget, which ie aeparate frots th€ CorDunfty tuaial
and which ic drawn up by different proceduree from thoee applying for thc
gcncrar budget, should no l0nger retain thlg abnornar poattion.
rr'r IsPrg ggeglg-tE:g-s3!-!e-s3ge-ie-$e-pEggeBg-gxg:L9g-98-glB-rgEggrsgg
I0. Poirrts out that the European Parliament hae come down in favour of a re-
' classificatlon of expenditure not directly related to the eomnon agricul-
t,uraI pollcy wlth a view to ensuring gr€at€r transparenqy and objecttviiy
in the diatributlon of budgetary resourcea.
IL. Regarde it aa essential that the existing system of orm resourcec be
,improved, to make it fuIly consistent with the principlea bf Connunity
law and with the responsibiritiec of community inEtitution.,
L2. Coneiders, therefore, that total harnonization of thG \IAT tax bare nurt
. 
be undertaken apeedily and preParations made for tha cubecgu€nt
harmonlzation of the rates, which is alao nceded if the renatning
frontier checks on intra-communlty trade are to be aboliehedi
13. Rcquestg that, pursuant to the decision of 2L April 1970, after
r lranuary 1983, vAT shourd no longer be colrectcd on ttre barlt of
statisticar egtimates, but on the basiE of tax decrarationc,
involving no additional adminictrative burdene, partlcularly
for smaIl and medium-sized undertakingB, so that this aource
of'revenuc becomes a veritable community vAT, pararler to
the natlonar vATa, beceuse assegged on the aarrp tax brse, but
leviad at Eeparate rates, indetrrndent of the nationar vAT rateli
14.
1(
.1
Rcaerdr it ar lopcntlrrc th.t thG Couierion rho*Ld
.uparvlrory Hl.r et lta dt.poul , in tlrc te$ltory ot
Statrrr
havr a0{quete
tlr fleiler
15' rt conglneed that lrylcmcntatlon of the abovc prlnetphr uill hclp t6
reducc nogltganct, fraud and tan cvaaiqnl to Lncrearo publlc ararcnedr.
of the exirtencc and progrecs of th6 CoEmnltyr to gllulnat tlrc arrdncoui,
but peralttont, notlon t*rat t*re Comunlty Le flnanccd frou the qchequerr
of the l,lcnbcr Etatcr.
il . !Es-9s4sgBi!r:!_te3E_PeusY
l.li. RGrtatec t}e porttlon it has hcld ginca
of loaha, eubJrct to ttrc twin conditiona
ratlonallrtd lhd that tt thould be rdrdcr
budgatary author{ty1
1975 in flvour of l,ncrcatcd uae
thrt th€ loan poliey rhall be
adoqrntc control of the
17. r: convincod that thia dcvclotmsnt L! necoreary if productivc lnv4t51mtr
and th€ convasgohcc of ttrc nati.onal ecoaotLaa lrc to bo eff,cctlvcly
pronotod,
18. re of the opinion that, to achieve theee objccttve!, thG couhunity,eborrorlng and lendlng operatl,onr rhould
total volune of 25)1- of th. anount of Ur€
EIB operatlont I
rapidly achLcvc an avange annual
Cmunlty brrdgat, crclusive of
19' rnvltce thG conrilrLon to exanine the poulbirity of encouraglng p.blic
aavinge through thc iesuer ginurtaneouely throughout tha comunity finaacc
narketg, of couunity bonas denonlnate'd Ln Ecu, end lookr foryardr topropoaala to thta effeet.
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v. EiteseiBg-e!-g!s-geEEe!ilx-Psgge!-U_!Ee_g!er!:!er$
20. Coneidere that the nec€ssary additional finance can be inJected in thc
ehort-term only by applyl,ng relatively rapid procedures and that, therefore,
such injeetlons muat be rcatricted to more extensive ugc of exleting
sources of finanee;
,r., Rules out, at the same time, the use of Common Custom3 Tariff dutiea ae
. 
an instrument of Community finance;
22, fs therefore of the opinion that, for the ehort te!m, raising the ceiling
on VAT above the 1% limit remaLns the moet appropriate meaBure in poli-
tlca1, inatltutional and adminlstrative terms, asauming that the Member
StateE, in accordance with their reepective constitutlonal requirements,
agree to th€ amendment of Articre 4(r), second paragraph, of the,Deci-
sion of 2t Aprtr 1970 concerning the maximuh rate of r%;
23.' Notes tlrat the most advisable solution is the aboli.tion of the ceilinq
: on Cornmnnity VAT;
vr . Be:!ls!sr!s!re!-!ErggsE_lggge!esy_LEgsgrsg
24. 'coneiders that, in order to introduce greater equity among the lle[iber
countriee in the community tax ayEtem, it is necessary to apply a corrective
mechanism to the VAT which in itE present forrn contains no elements of
progressivity;
25. Is convinced that, in order to achieve a tangible increase in budget
expenditure having a redistributive effect - with the prime aim of
, reducing per capita income inequalities and eer.rnomic disparitiee between
' r'ogions - i L is nL'cesscir), to intrOduce weight ^ngs f or VAT transfere ;
26. Prr.rposes thcrc tr.rrc :
(a) a weighting based otr the dlfferent gross domestic producta of the
Community lvlem!:er States expre .,cl in per capita purchasing pcmer
- tl.rough a coefficient
with redistributive effect based on the abova- or beror-
ul,'eraqe lever of groes domeetic product exprerled in pcr
cirprta purchasing power,
- this coefficient to be calculated in such a way that each Member
stat,e'a deviation from thc comnunity average ic establirhod, and
then
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- the valuc added tax amount for each individual tlember Stata,
expreated aa l0Or la lncreaaed or dccreared by a tonth Part
of this deviatlon.
(tr) n woiqhting boaerl on the lrtcmbcr State3'share of the Connunlty'e
tol .rI popul.ltion:
- through an addltlonal coGfficlent bamd on tha aborro- or
belou-averags proportion of the total Comunlty populttton
figure,
- thia coefficlcnt to be calculatcd in auch a way that each
Irtenber State'r deviation fron a notional aver:age of 10?6 of
thG total population'iB e.tabliahed, and then
- the value added tax anount for each lndivtdual l,lsubcr Stat€,
expregaed at IOO., ie increaeed or decrcased by a tenth part
of thia dcvi.rtlon. I
vr r'. rina!siEg-95-$9-ggB8gEi!r-!sggg!-1!-gE9-EeglE!:!grs
27. Ia convinced that, although the corrective meehanisn enviaaged in
paragraphe 24:26 of the preaent reeolution doeg introduce greater
equity between the l,hmber countriec (taking each as a wholc) r it ir
not prcAreasive in its inpact on individual taxpayGrs r hence VAT and
cuatoma dutiea must not bc allowed to renlain the only taxcsofa Cmrunity
that ailne to concttn itrelf inercagingly witir cquity ln thc eeonomlc,
gocial and flrcal apherea; 
-
2t1. cousi(lore that. Eottcrring any cornmunity harmonization of pereonal
irrcouc t'ax, eorporaulon tax and taxea on eonBumption (such as VAT),
theee taxeB may form a new baeis for the Conmunity'B flrt re3ourceEi
1
-See Annex II to the resolution
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v r. r r . lLlg-!ssr!t:l!t:!t,.tb!!r-!:l!!lltIr
29. In thc knowlcclgc thilL lrlle grorth of the comrnunity's resPonsibilities'
and hence of its revenue and expenditure, cannot take Place without
strong participation by aII the political institutions
, regards it as eesential that an appropriate procedure be
introduced for this participation;
30. proposes, therefore, that in view of ite responsibillty before the
comunity.selectorate,eachnetltyelectedEuropeanPirliamentghould,
in the courge of the first year following its election :
(a) eonsider with the Commlsslon whether, and under what eondltlons, therc
should be a reallocatlon of responsibilltles and flpanclfl rttourqes
between the l.{ember States and the Community;
(b) if appropriate, adopt and for*rard to the other Inetitutlona a draft
joint declaration on the Community's filancial needs and regources
for the next five-Year Perlod;'
31. ConeiderE it esEential that, by virtue of the financial autonomy of the
Communlty, the Institutions should henceforth be able to amend or rein-
force the cmn resources system themselves - and therefore invites the
Commiesion to recommence the procedure for revLsion of Article 201
EEc initiated in 1973, taking account of the proposal annexed to this
resoluri on.1
32. Believes that in this way the determination of the Community's new tasks
and the consequent costs could become the central theme of future
European electoral campaigna in which all the parties would necessarlly
take part; ahd that the debate on fiscal matterE between the
varLous Institutions would thus
beeome a general political debate on the Conmunity'a objectivec for the
follorving five-year period.
Ix. 99!glggig!s_
33. ltequests th.rt- itr i t-s l)r()(Ir.rnme to be prescntcd to thG European parliorneut
Llrc ncw ('omm i ss i on slrou ltl :
- undertake above all to propose without delay the abolition of the I%
ceiring on the vAT yierd'(see paras . 22 and z3l and the vAT correctivc
mechaniem (see paras. 24 to 26 I tlsee Annex I to the resolution
- 11 - PE 64.634/flo.
undertakc to pr€.Gnt propoaals
in llne with th€ riehes of the
to 19);
t
I
Ifor developing th€ loanB policy
European parlianent (rsc pana. J.6
include the coreeponribility
lraras. 7 and $;
levy in the budget rrrvsnue (rcc
give preci8e details of the tinetablc for preaenting pr3opo3all on:(a) complete harmonization of the baaia of aegeganent and
eubeeguently of VAT rates - eee paragraph 12 above;
(b) lntroduction of, thc decraration-'baged mthod of vAT
collection 
- 8€€ paragraph 13 abo.rre i
(c) supervlsion of, collcction of dutiea 
- aee pragraph 14
above i
(d) the laruc of ECU-derrorninated commturrty bondc - see
paragraph 19 above;
(e) poeslble harmonisation of the basls of aar.esment a,,d of the
ratoe of direct and lndirect taxrtion 
- BGc pt*g.rFh 2g.!bovr,;
- withclraw the 1973 proposal for an a*end,ment of Article 20r EEc andintroduce a new propoaal ln line with the deci,eion-roaking meehanian
suggeated by the Europ€an parlianent _ s6e paragta,phg 30 to 32 above i
34' As regards the futurE uae of the coarmunity's qrtl raaourcaa, undertakesto defhe the rospoa.lbilitiss which lie Jointry or eeveralry witt, theCotilnunlty and thc Usmber States;
35. rn'tructs its preeident to forrrard thie reaolution and theite committ€€ to the Commigsion,. th€ national parliam€nta,
and the eov€rnmente rnd parliro€nts of Spain lrrd Eortugal.
raPort of
the Council,
-12- PE 64.634/fLa.
'rile Co.~ ... ' :Hli on 'll.o'lll 
0xnrnin~ t~~ gonl~tLnn~ 
unn•'X: W": :·h tt.r· fi.niln-
cia: cnn:ributlnGA of 
Jo\¢r.'l1JCI: ~;t.li'N'I .,~;wicl~rl 
for Ln ~rttclo ~on could 
bo rcplnc,..,'l by t:l.c ce.mm~ 
.. ni •: y 1 !.:1 <>wn r.t.•• :'li.IL'coa, in 
1.(\r:.u:•d·ll' b',' r '>'<"nut. 
ace •.. :Lnq t'~om 1 .1;• ;'::1tat110n 
C'l1IH"or:.r.· t·~rtff .. ,,, .. ,,it has 
hec:·, f1:·.illly it.t•"·hl\:t'd, 
'i'O thia (Jrd, t.' •:l c.; •. >:nmission 
sha 1.;. Sl.t"'~l.· .. ): -po:;;~:llj to 
thv Ccv·· .. ~ . .~.. 
/. ~·. r ,. . r' I 1 t ~ . I ' }I.-. 
'. 1.,, •,,JJ. •J.", r >· .1· l·r()J.,'·a-
. '•t , .• ,. (' ,j.(.'J :(1,'! ·.: • .l•.·t-
.. :1. 1 .r \,;;.: ... H ~, , l•l '1 \i()Wi 
ti.•.'. ·1 '• :1 "l.!lt• ;;,·,:.:r,vtflJ..O:'!S, 
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Text prop~sed by·the 
commission on 10.10.1973 
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new to~otu·r"<'B rnuv llo 
allocntoct ~n the 
communi tic!:>. 
At· lr\ltnt ('VPl'Y fl~Jt" ~·crort,C!:. 
t )Jf• I,"OIHH'i} t •'t rt·t·r t:'f"'e ... 
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('<.lllill•iHRiOn <\Otl C'DIU~I,]tit\q 
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- 13 -
ANNEX ·t . 
.. .,,_....._ .. -·~···-.. .,-...... _~ ........ . 
~ 1 Te-xt proposed by;th~ 
European Parliament· 
•rhro commission shall 
< )o.<t•nin~ in what mann~:r · 
J)!~'.w .. :.::xl.!.tinq q:m 
.!.: ':">.'~~l!.S:::~J:11USt. £e . <•.· 
;\hi ,q~1..1 2$· new rea• ' 
r·•ll:;··<":-; may . e all.o-
\ .. ,.~_! t <>~ tel the · 
r·' ,. ,,~. tlll L t: i e~a. 
Rvrory fiv~ ya~rv Lh• 
t ··~'~~~'' l 1 l.lnd !'nr ;!J 1<\nt .• 
a ee rt•Nl v 1'19 a 
rlllport from the COlllm-
iusion, $hnll examine 
whrth~r an~ in what 
nu'lnnOO' r J.1.t;! 1m':i. stl.U5! 
2!!'.!.LE!:!!lli~~e!'l !!D.9J!M 
!!<' !.~h<''~~!lt'f~ {')':l" t"H'~W 
ont·n <."t4•ltt .... d .. 
on ~ prnposal frot:t' 1 .,., 
r:or.:mi asioo a.nd aft~,; 
U·tt<~nimOt\S, alijre~tn\ent 1 n 
th" Coun<:lil, th(! 1\::;,;r:>m-
hly, voting by a n~ :-
ority ot its mtnmber.s 
a, .. :! t.h re~-fi fths of 
the votes cast, may 
·ctwr.ge tht'! l~xist;i.ng · 
~"on ;::esours;e§ or. 
create new re6ourqas. 
.. 
.. 
. 
: r, 
' ' 
,..·· ..... 
: . ~ .. -----· 
,i. 
1.•, 
"i' 
P~ 64.634/fin./.Ann.l 
I 
~ 
J 
I 
L 
I 
I' 
f j 
!. 
vs3 rEl(ll4lrrre tGcE]f,Istt }TEl( II
Bclglum
Dcnmark
@rmany
Franca
trcland
rtrly
LuxrnboUg
Nothsrlradr
Unltcdl Klngdom
Tablo 2
Sclglum
Dcnm!rk
G€rmtny
Francc
IrolandItaly
Lurcmbourg
Nethcrlandr
Unltcd Klngdorn
fablc 3
Trbla I
Belglum
Dcnmark
Gcrmrny
Francc
Irc IandItely
IJuxe mburg
N€therlrndr
Unltod Kingdom
Gao.r domtlc product
4.68162.79
31.75tr
23.6U
0.5$6
13.4 tr
o. t7*
6.34r
t6.6sr
Shem of populatlon
3.79r
t.97*
23.5s*
20.5s%
r.25X
2L.90r
0.1.1*
5.3eil
21.45tr
ItC awrrgo
2t16
38tr
3516
r5r
Sttx
3816
2r,6
t€*
22*
dtvLation froa IOi
- 6.21S
- 
g.o3r
+ 13. se6
+ IO.55X
- 8.?4X
+ 11.90*
_ 9.e%
- 4.61tr
+ 11.45fi
+
+
+
+
l
+
1
budgrt (in m
I coof,f.
302
'L7r
2'223
1,669
37
738
13
403
l,175
6,756
cogQbl.at
102. t 6
to3.G
ro3. s*
101.5*
9s.oil
96.2r
102. lI
101.ff.
97.fr
cottitcbnt
ee.aff
99.2*
rot.ar
lol. lx
99.Itr
lol.zttrgg.0r
99.5r9
10r.1*
Table 4
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Denmark
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Unlted Klngdom
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ro4.9tr
102.6r
94.L?6
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BEXPIANATORY STATH,IENT
At its meeting of 28 November 1979 the Committee on Budgets
decided to set up an ad hoc l{orking Party to examine the queetion of
the development of the Community's o$rn resourceE.
This group, chaired by !,tr Spinelli, vice-chairman of the Committee
on Budgets, comprised the fotlo.ring memberg of the Conmittee on dudgets:
Irlr Ansquer, llr Arndt, tlr Barbi, I.{r Nord and I'1r,f.M. Taylor.
On the basis of a preliminary working docunent prepared by
Mr Spinelli. the Working Party organized its work around six principal
themes, each member of the party drawing up a working docunent on one of
these themes:
- Mr Ansquer: 'an aEsessment of the present system of orrn re3ourceg
for the Community' (PE 63.459/fLn.l,
- Irtr Arndt: 'redistribution through budgetary measureg' (PE 63.557/fLn.l ,
- !!r Barbi: 'the ratio between Conrmunity and national financial
resources' (PE 53.557/fLn.l ,
- Mr Nord: 'the decision-making machinery for the Community's own
resources' (PE 63.435) ,
- l'1r Spinetli: 'new ovrn r€sourceE for the CommUnity' (PE 54.510),
- Mr Taylor: 'the Community's loan policy' (PE 53 .75L/fLn.) .
These documents are annexed to the present report and constitute
its explanatory statement.
On the basis of the above documents !,lr Spinelli drevr up a motlon
for a resolution which was adopted by the Committee on Budgete on
3 December 1980.
lfhe working party began its activities on 18 Decentber 1979 and
ended them on 30 April 1980. It held six meetings and heard
statements from the Comrnissioner responsible for budgetary matters and
Eeveral high-ranking officials of the Cornnieeion's economlc and budgetary
departments.
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Ihe working party drev, notably on the follorring docunents I
- the Commission'e 'green paper' of 23 November I97B entitled
'Financing the comaunity budget: lrhe way ahead' (aee gupplernent
8/7a to the Bulletin of the European comnunitiee),
- the study by a group of experts (the UacDougall group) of
April L977, entitled ,Rsport of the study group on the role
of public finance in European integrationi .
It should finally be recorded that the Working party had
intended to obtain statenente from geveral European speclaridtE. in
public finance, but the restrictions imp,osed by
the budget situation at the beginning of the f,inancial year 19go
(tire system of provieional hrelfths) nads it inpoasible'to arrange
this hearing.
- i6 - PE 64.634/fui.
I.
the ratio betrreen comnrunity and
national financial resources
Draftsman: ldr BABBI
PE 54.634/tLn.-17-
iINTR@UCTIOI
l. This document draws on the ideae put fonard in the working Frrty'8
prograrme under the heading 'ratio betwcon Ccnurunity and national flnancial
resources'.
2. Throughout its r*ork the working party has been struck by the groring
disparity betr,veen:'
- the amhitious goals Eet for the Connnunity in the Treatieg and in the moat
recent statamente by the Heada of Government of the tlember Stateo, notably
at the Bremen Srrmitl,
and
- the paueity of the financial resourcea currently anailable to the
Communities and the reluctance of the lieads of Governnent to increase
them.
3. It became apparent to the'working party that the reaaona for thie
disparity, which becones more serious aa the available resourcea are us€d
uP, are both political and technical and can be gurmarizcd ae follons:
- 
the challenging (particularly since enlargencnt) of the objective of
Community integration with eonaequent doubta aB to how far the cqmon
policies ehould go;
- the persistencre (and even hardening) of trbniber States' resistancr to the
transfer of Eovereign porera to the Conmunity, both at the leve1 of natlonal
administrativc bodies and of political authorities;
- a degree of disillusion at hon little progreaB has b€en made towards
economic convergence, despite the effects of the op€ning up of marketE
and of active redistribution policies;
- 
growing doubt aB to the effectiveness of Eoe existing Conmunity Ercliciee,
particularly the principal among them, the agricultural policy, which are
often over-compartmentalized and pursued out of the nain national and
Community economl.c context.
- increaeed budgetary difficultiee fac€d by the lbmber States aE a consquence
of the general 
€conodic trend since 1975.
I Concerning strengthening Cmnunity action in ttre fields of, energy,industrial structures and ernplolzment.
- 18 - pE 64.634/f1.n.
5.
(a)
4. It is not for the working party to cdnment on the political factors
referred to above. But under its general terms of referance concerning the
evolution of orrn iesources it can legitimately try by its commnts to plaee
the problem of financing the Cqnmunity in a more accurate pergpective than
Ehat generally adopted by the council or the cqnnlssLon.
These comments are as follonrE:
at their present Ievel, the resourcee allocated to the Comrunity are
still quite marqinal in relation to the budgets and total public
expenditure of the l'lember States i '
much gqrununity expenditure ariseB out of a tranefer of resp'onsibilitieE
from the tGmber States,to the Comnrunity and therefore doas not involve
any net increase in total Public expenditurc;
comSnred with national expenditure, Conuuunity expenditure has an
appreciab1e@(mu1tip1iereffectandeconomiesof
scale) ;
(d) the effectivenese of certain forrns of connrunity expenditure could be
improved, making savinqs of resourcee poesible;
(e) if its benefits are to be at all significant, Connrunity expcndlture
must pass a critical threshold, which is still a long way off, and
form part of a coherent overall econqnic policy'
Each of these comments is developbd separately in the follcrring
paragraphs.
I. THE I,IARGIIBL CInNACTER OF COUMI'NITY RESOTIRCES
5. The overall level of Cqrununity resources (14,600 m EIA in 1979) must
always be'considered in relation to the total amountE raised by the llomber
States to finance their public expenditure and also in relation to the l
overall wealth of the Community aa expregsed by its grosa donrestic produCt'
7. The follovring table demonstrates thevery modest Eize of the Comrnunity
budget in relation to the total of public expenditure by the l'hmber StateB
in the varioue aectors ln which they are active'
(b)
(c)
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EEC BT'DGET AS A PERCENTAGE OF:
tlEmber
Stateg'
budgets
lbmber Stdtes'
total public
expenaiturel
Itlember Statgsl
sroag ddrastic
froduct2
I97 3
1974
L97s
L976
L977
1978
1979
T'A
2.O
r.8
1.8
2.O
1.9
2.6
2.8
1.29
1.21
r. 17
1.34
L.26
r.7l
L.75
0.53
0.51
0.55
0.61
0.57
0.80
0.83
EI.A
Expendltute at
securJ.ty
Nominal value
Gov€rnment, ragional and loca1 and for aocial
8. rt is aleo instructlve to compare the paat rat€s of grmth of theae
various factore in ordet to as;eas the evblution since 1973 of CormunLty
expenditure ageinat national expendlture and elso againet GDp.
9. The follqring table providee thio cdnparLson:
ANNtIilIJ RATE OF &,OTTII SINCE 1973
88C
Eudgct
llotriber States'
budg€t-'
I'tetrrbcr
totrl
' Statee'pblic
turcl
tNcnb€r
g!:033
L97 4
1975
L976
L977
1978
L979
8.5
23.4
28.6
6.1
45.4
16.9
21.3
27.3
13. 2
12.6
15.5
11
15.8
27.L
L4.2
13. 3
12.8
13. I
13.5
L4.6
16.1
L2.B
r0.5
L2.2
I expenditure at
2 No.ina} value
goverruitent, regional and loca1 and for social eecurity
I0. Despite their relatirrely emall size, the 1evying of Connunlty rGaourcea
ean have an unsettling effeet on the nati.onal budgets of the lbnrber Stat€B.
The Council's unwillingnese to l-ncrease Coruntinity expenditure ie known to bc
motivated to some extent by a fear of aggravating national budgetary dcflclte.
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Are these fearg founded? First of all, it must be pointed out that Eince
1975 Community resources have not cqfle out of the budgetary revonue of the
Member States. lIhey are the Conununity's ggg resources collected independently
and directly from taxpayers. lloreover, theEe Conrrrunlty 'cnrn resoure€s1 (1.e.
Ievies and customs duties) are payable to the community by virtue of the
existence of a custsns union which implies the pooling of such resourcea.
Therefore, BDY unsettling effect which Community 'Ieviee' may have on
national budgets must be considered in the light of the relationship betrraen
tho Cornnrunity's non-cornmercial orirn resout"""l and the total of the national
budgets.
II. The follcrring table illustratee this relationship. Like the preceding
tables, it is based on the Comrnunity average without reference to the
particular budgetary situation of individual lGmber Statee. It Ehcma clearly
that on average the VAT financial contribution to osvn reBourcea remaine wholly
marginal in relation to the overall size of the rntional budgets and there-
fore can have no more than a tiny effect on the net budgetary situation of
the !,tedber States.
Non-cqunercial ovrn resources
as a percentage of national budgetsl
reTs 0.61 )
Ls76 0-62 I 
'oILs77 0'56 )
1978 I;13 I
LsTs 1.3s I t*
tt GNP and comnunity \l"AT contributlona
II. TgE TRI{NSFER OF }U\TIONIIL FIDIANCI]AIJ RESPONSIBIITITIES fO IIIE CO[lMtNIT1f
t2. It muEt also be made clear that the financial reeponeibilities
assumed by the community are not necesgarily additional to the exiating
public expenditure of the lEmber States.
13. Most of the reeourcee allocated to the Community go to finance expen-
diture no longer covered by the national budgets: the overall burden on
the taxpayer is only slightly increased by this transfer.
1 i... from 1975 to 1978 financial contributions\Ere baEed on GNP; from
1979 onwards these contributions have been replaced (for six of the
Member StateE) bY ComnuniLY VAT.
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L4. ol'er 60S of the Cmmunity's resourceg are devoted to agricultural
market support which at prea€nt ie whoIly financed by the Cdfirtrunity. ItrErCr
the'transfer effect' is conplete, in contrast to policies to inprove agri-
cultural structurea, which are still largely financed by the Stateg.
15. There are other Bectors, such ae reeearch and aid (financial and food
aid) to developing countries, where at least a partial- tranefer, of
budgetary reeponsibility has occurred. Ihe exact size of guch transfers Ls,
honrever, dlfficult to measure in the absence of euitable Btatlstical too1E.
Furthermore, theee transfere are freguently hindered or held up becauae of
opposition from thc national administrations which nray give riEe to an
unwarranted increase Ln the overall financial burden, at leaEt temporarily.
16. Horr€ver, therc are also important ar6aE of Cmnunity activity where
the overall financial requirement is such thet th€ Ccmunl.ty'E effortg are
added to, rather than substituted for, the efforts of the tGmber Statea.
Among these ar€as mention might be made of regional policy ae a whole and
aid Lo industrial sectors in difficulty (iron and steel industry).
rrr. rrrE pR@ucTI\rE EFEECT oF cpuut,urTy Ex(pBfIrIT{rRB
L7. We should recall here a eelf-evident truth of econouLce which many
people seem to haye forgotten, namely that Comrunity expenditure ahould
generally be more productive than the national expenditure which it replacea
or supplementE.
18. Some Community expenditure has an appreciable multiplier effect, which
means that its potontial benefit (in econonic and budgetary terma) is dis-
proportionately large compared with the outlay. 1ftris ia particularly true
of the creation and organization of the lnternal Conrmunity market. Itre
expenditure incurred (essentially operatlng expenditure) has opaned up a
vast unified rnaiket which v,as one of the driving forces behind the ecqrouic
gro^rth of the 195Os. Similarly, all m€aaur€rs for the harmonization of
regulations, manufacturing standards 
€tc. are bound to produce collective
benefits far beyond their coat, which is no more than adrniniEtrative.
19. fhe same multipli€r effect can be found in the EllS where the rystem'B
negligible running costs ar6 rnore than offsat by its stabilizing effects
and by the reeultant eavings in terms of intervention by national banl<s on
the foreign exchange markets. Generally speaking, all expenditure on
coordination and harmonization hae a very considerable multLplier effect.
20. In the field of intervention expenditure, Ccrununity action can aleo be
moreproductivethannationa1meaguresthanksto@.iIoint
action by the !.!ember States permits bigger projects which are more effective
than piecomeal action, on a smaller sca1c, by indivldual lrtember Stctee.
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In the strict Community context, there have not yet been many examples ofjoint actions of this type, apart from research and, to a certain extent,
data proeessing. At the level of intergovernmental cooperation, horrv€ver,
a number of joint operations have been launched (particularly in the aero-
Bpace field) with the object'.of cutting project coBts.
IV. II{PROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COD{MT'NITY EXPEI{DITT'RE
,r. *"t. 
"." 
* no doubt that the return on Cffinunity expenditure, and on
public expenditure in general, could be inproved, In other words, there ig
scope for gilgg in expenditure (and hence resources).
22- The most significant savinge could be made in the EAGGP and without
having to change the airne and methods of the common agricultural policy.
It is clear that in agriculture, only narginal importance has hitherto been
attached to costs and financial effectiveneEs. Greater budgetary discipline
both in the planning and the management of the agrioultural policy would
permit substantial cost reductions.
23. rn general, and without wishing to enter into the question of the
eontrol of expenditure in the strict sense, since it is outside the scope
of the present report, it can be eaid that the Communities have neither
philosophy nor method on cost effectiveness control. Although tln financial
conseguences of new projecta are more or less closely scrutinized before
adoption, there is no method for calling into question.t'he cost oi policies
already decided upon and implemented.
The l:odgetary authority is not coneerned with the financial effectiveness
of the ''operations voted" i-e- current prograflunes, and concentratea it'
attention on the deveroEnent of thoge programmes and on ne\il prograrnmeB,
although they only constitute l0% of the totar voLume.
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24. Your rapporteur therefore considers that a ' in the verlous
areas of Conununity activity. He believee that two techniquee already tried
and tested abroadl could be usefully applied to Community extrrnditure:
- 
systorEtic review (after two or three years) of q!-1 Connrunity exFnditure
programmda in order to determine whether, having regard to their finanqlal
effectiveness, theY should be:
. cancelLed
. continued unchanged
.continUedatadifferent(higher,/lurer)levelofexpenditure
- 
annual authorization Of eactr progralune bas€d on a costll'enefit analyais
of all the elemente of the programme and in accordance wlth clear
priorities worked out by the CommisEion'
25. Likc mogt public bodies, the community does not always pay enough
attention to the sound financial management of ite policies. It do€s,
however, have the advantage of being a relatively flexible and youthful
organization and so should find it easier than the l'iember StateE'adrrini-
strations to stBmp out any budgetary laxity by adopting attitudee and
methods more conducive to Eound financial management.
26. It i6 recognized that in public finance, intervention only achLeves
its optimum effectivenese above a certain level of expenditure, which
obviously variee according to the objective aimed at'
27. public expenditure progranmas only really Etart to take off where
financial intervention reaches a given level Ln relation to the total cOst
of the operation. Beyond this critical threshold, the marginal effieiency
of expenditure inereageE considerably, ae does the likelihood of actulIly
eolving the problem under coneidEration.
2A. Hotever, if expenditure remains belqr this critical level, it can do
no more than prev€nt the deterioration of a given situation, and funds are
likeIy to be dissipted indefinitely.
1 O.ai.o1arlv the ,sunget bill' and 'zero-budgetinq' eystemc used in the
United StateB.
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Zg . ftris principle certainly applies to Community public finance. By t'Iay
of oxample two areas can be guoted in which, through lad< of sufficient
appropriations, intervention did not reach thie critical threshold and so
failed to achieve ite object. lfhose are, the transformation of agricultutal
structures (particularly in the dairy Eector) and regional disparitiag.
In essential sectors, such as energy and transPort, projects and eo
expenditure are still only at an eribryonic etage and are therefore even
further away fron this threshold.
30. on a more general rever, a group of expert"r h"" eEtimated, on the
basis of certain assumptione aE to the developnent of the Conununity, that
the critical threshold for the Community budget might be around 2'5% of
the community's grosg donrestic product (as againet 0.83% in 1979).
lloreover, these experts have been able to calculate that an increase
in Community expenditure of some 10, OOO 6EIIA concentrated on the weaker
llember States and regions would permit the present p€r capita lncome gap
between the lrlember States to be reduced by about 1()%'
CONCI,USIONS
3 t. lrhe working party could set forth a number of findings baeed on the
prosent document which would provide a general framework for the worklng
party,s other more technical progrosals. TtreEe findings, referred to in
paragraph 5 above, can be eummarized as follorle:
I. Cotlununity expenditure rePresents only a tiny fraction of total public
expenditure in the cqnnrunity and its evolution therefore has no
appreciable effect on the internal financial situation of the ltember
States;
Z. Essential'Iy, the financial responeibilities aEsumed by the Community
' are in eubstitution for budgetary responsibilities of the tGdb€r States;
probably IesE than 2O?A of Communlty expenditure is genulnaly addlitional
to national exPenditure;
3. Certain types of community expenditure (particularly in the field of
harmonization and coordination of nationat policies) are especially
productivei as far as intervention expenditure is concerned, the
Conmunlty can finance joint induetrial projects mor€ cheaPlyl
4. The Communlty's financial managenent suffers from a lack of budgetary
discipline in the planning of certain common policies (in Particular,
t[re agricultural guarantee policy) and from the absence of accurate
cost/benefit control methods; the competent bodies of Parliament
should take specific action in this connection;
r 
,.ed by sir Donald trlcDougall
-25- pE 64.634./fin.
5.
(
Cmuntty ex;rnditure .wilI probably not be fulty ef,fective, i.e.
profit€bre, unrees it exeeeds a threghord which can bc Estirnated
roughly at 2.5% of the Community'B total grosa domestic prroduat,
on the asaunptlotr that this increaee is brought about prtnelpally
by the transf€r of the public reaponaibilities of the u6mb€r gttt€s
to the Conmunityr dnd therefore without any sigmlficant increaae in
the overalL tax burden on the individual.
only if the budgat passes this throshord will it be poaelbre to have
effective managelrent at Community level of thoEe proJects which,ernnot
be undertaken individually by the Irlenrber States and whose develogrrent
reguires coordination and cooperation betTeen the l,hmber states.
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II.
an aasesement of the present system of
ohrn reEources for ttre Comnunities
Draftsman: ltT ANSQIIER
- 
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IHTBODUCTIPN
I. Ttrie docunent is based on the *uidelineg set out in the chaptcr
of the working party'a progranune of worh cntitlcd'analysla of, and chrngea
to existing ovrn resources' .
2. with the Conrnission's agsistancc the working prrtlz har reviowad
and analysed in depth aII tha sources of. Conrrunity revenu€, concontrating
particularly on the three main ones:
- agricultural levies,
- customc duties,
. VAT.
3. Ttris docurnGnt simply sets out to explain thc nain trxoblema crsatcd
by the present eysten of, r€sourses and to put f,orvard in as much detail
as possible suggeatione for improvcmsnts.
4. After a brief Etatistical staten€nt of the voluma of th€ various
reaourc€s, the document goeB on to discuse thc follorrirrg polntar
(1) strrcific problems relating to different tlzpes of regourccet
(2) the financlal indetrrndence of the Cormunity;
(3) inspection maasures for the collection of recources.'
Ttro further chapters are devoted to ctrrcific problemc raiecd by
para-fiscal and ECSC r€sources.
I. THE VOIJUUE, TREND AN' BBAIOCiIN OE 0IIE BESGIR-CES
(a) Present Eituation
5. The nost recent figures available on Conmunity resources relate
to the 1979 financial y."rl, they can be readily compared with thosa in
the new preliminary draft budget for 1980 (preaentcd by the Comuieeion on
19 February I98O):
'l
- Figures based on actual results.
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Agricultural levieo. .. .
Sugar/isoglucose levies.
Customs duties
I\/AT-.
cNP contributione2
Other
L979
1,679
465
5,189
4,738
2,3O2
2:lL
L4,604
nine in 1980
n.EUA
r980
1,685
49L
5,668
6,694
173
L4,7L2
cNP contributions
\IAT resources(+ migcellaneous
ss.W.)
39.82
34.72
32.72
46.22
249.8'
46.74
1 ._Pald
2 .-pa].o
by
ry
TOTAL.
Eix Member StateE in 1979'and
three lrlember States in 1979.
(b) Breakdown of the various ordn reEources
--:------
The trend Eince 1975 ie Eet out below:
Levies
1975. 9.5
L976. . L4.5
L977. . 2L
1978. r8.8
L979. . L4.7
'l1980-. 14.8
cuatoms duties
50.7
50.8
46.3
35
3s. 5
38. 5
'l
' ,re, preliminary draft budget of 29-2.1980
2 Gro"" National Product contributions
3 ON, contributions for three l,lember States and \IAT for cix ltcrnbcr States
4 
*, for nine Member Stateg
( c ) EESB€ 
-!a-lEe-r-e!e-en€-rielq-eE-!Ag
In 1979 the VAT rate was. " " ' "O'7%
for 1980:
. tho rate ProPosed in the initial preliminary draft budget
(ineludlng lattcrg of amendment Nos' I and 2) "'0'8996
. the rate proposed in the draft budget (of 23 Novembcr) war..o.77%
. the rate ProPosed in the new preliminary draft
budget of the CommisEion is. 'O'58%
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6. According
from Community \lAE
be: n.EUA
r98O. 9,9OO
1981. IO,9OO
1982. 1I,9@
, (12,9001e83. ... 
' 
ii5;;oo
(d ) Ielgt-esg-EeeesEses-3vsil3!le-geE-!Ee-EeEleg-I9991I991
7. on Lhe basis of the Commission'g lategt forecaate the total volurne
of own reaourcea available in l98or/1983 under the present systeut
would be: tr.EUA
I
to the CornrniEEion's latest forecasta the maxinum yield
- i.e. from the I% tate - for the period 1980,/1983 trould
Irvies and suqar Custotss duties 1% \'AT
-
9,91O
10,9lO
LL,924
L3,235
rotal
L7,755
19,13O
20,655
22,465
Ievies
1980. .... 2,L77
198r. 2, I83
L982. 2,243
1983. 2,288
5, 658
5,o37
6,488
6,942
theee forecaste are very8. unreliable given:It is'cIear that
the very unEtable natur of worldr/Community
and hence of the levies;
the uncertainties surrounding future trade
revenue accruing from cusbms duties;
the uncertalnty about the yield of.the \rAT
the absence of final reeultB for the first
which thia new relourc€ was fully applied
agricultural prices
flgwa and hence the
asseaBttpnt btgig i.n
financial ye,ar in
(197e) .
9. Overall, the
average annual growth
resourceE:
Commiasion' s estimatee
rates for each of the
r would eugg€st the folloring
three main categories of mrr
+1to+2%
+6to+7%
+ 10 to + 11%.
levies.
cuatoma duties.
vAT..
rr. PFqBLE!{S RELAtrING rO IHE \IAR,rOUS TrpES OF RESOIJRCES
10. By separating trade-linked orrn reaourcea (Ievies and customa
duties) from Cornrrunity \IAT, it is possible to attenpt to list the main
advantages and disadvantages of these rbgourceE.
(a) Trade-linked olrn resources
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11. On the positive side these resources are qenuine Community
resources in that they are:
. paid in full, directly and automatically to the Comnrunity,
. linked to the operation of varioua cotnmon policice which
constitute the very foundations of the Comrrunity
agricultural policry, commercial policy and Conrtunity
preference.
L2. These reEources do hovrever present a number of political and
financial drawbacks:
. they are indirect taxes of which Europ€an taxPay€rs are
totally unarrare and hence do nothing to reinforce comflunity
solidarity;
. they fluctuate quite independently of budgetary financing
reguirements;
. they are not dynamic: the extension of Cormnunity pref€rcnce
and the general reduction in customs dutiee mean that thay actually
groh, more elotrly than budgetary needs or even inflation;
. L& of the yield is paid back to the lt{ember Statee by way of
reimbursement of the collection costs incurred by national
customs services; in 1979 serne 733 rnillion EUA waa repaid in
this way.
(b) lEI
13. The initial results of the epplication (to six Menber States)
of VAT in the period since I ilanuary 1979 will not be known until
JuIy l98O and only then will it be possible to make an initial asEeeament
of the operation of this ne\i, resource.
L4. However, a number of points can be made at this stage, namely:
- 
\nT is not a specifically Community tax; adrnittedly the cornmunity
rate is applied directly to the harmonized basis of aseegsnrent quite
independently of the various national rates: it does not therefore
represent a surtax on national \rAT nor a levy on the national \tAT yietd.
This tax is however an indirect tax shared betrveen the Conmunity and the
Irtember States - and taxpayers are aurare for the mott Ptrt of the national
component, which accounts for a far greater Proportion;
- 
\AT is a more suitable way of financing the budget than trade-
linked own resources as its rate is a direct function of expenditure
requirements, being calculated on the basis of the difference between total
approved expenditure and the total revenue expected from trade-linked
resources i
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- ve? ls a fairlY dYnamic
and inflation; it does not howaver
parameters unlike direct taxeE;
- a number of problcmg relating to the assccaDant baaig and
the collection of corununity \/AT have etill to be eolved. Although
harmonized, the vAT aaa€aament basis in th€ nlne !ftenbar states is atill
subject to many axceptiona, derogationa and exemptiong which could bc
abolished from I ilanuary 1983. tloreover, \IAT is co1l6cted eascntially on
the basie of statiatical estimates and not the declaratlone aubmittcd lir
those subject to the tax; the regulation lnplcrnanting the sixth \z|E
directive leaves th€ tl€nber statos free to chooEe betvrecn theee trro
methods and cight of thcnr have chogen the forner, which eliminatee any
viEible link bctileen the taxPaysr and the Comunity aa it ig the national
revenue servicee which calculate the Cormunity and national share of the
vAT yield; this asp€ct is aleo due to be atandardized in 1983.
(c ) Ergeeg:Ie-9!-!89-sgEErsg-83!!r
15. Despitc thelr inadequacies and inlnrfections thca€ ttro tylra of
own resourc€a ar6 a gr6at achieverncnt of the comunity and one which murt
be prcserved. 'lllre working Party night thcreforc conline itaclf to reqriirtiig
that the following improvements be made tO the exi6t!.ng syatem of Corununity
vAT by I ilanuary 1983:
- harmonization of the entire bagig of asseaamenti
- wider use of the declaration-baeed method of collection.
III. IITE FINANCIAL INDEPBNDENCE OF TEE CCIOIUUITI
16. lltre existence of comunity oum reaourceg ie not in iteelf
sufficient to guarantec the Comunity total financial independence from
the l,tember States. B€fore thie can happen the Comieeion nuat be able
to calculate thesc resourcea lndependentllr it nuet bc f,rce to diapoac of
them as it wisheg and they must no longcr be included In national budget8.
tax in that it kccpa pace with coneumptLon
grow at a faater rate than thcee two
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ta) !s!is3!!sg ovvn regource8
l'/ . When preparing the draft budget it is necessary to cetlmat
the resources likely to be available for the following f,inanclal year:
this estimate is very important as it nay have a direct bearing on the
volume of expenditure authorized; we all know for example how the
prospect - based on revenue eEtimates - of cxceeding the 1% \7AT ceiling
can induce one or other of the parties compoaing the budlgct authorlQr
to restrict the level of appropriationE authorizsd.
I8. ft iE essential therefore that the Comnission should have the
right and the means to prepare complctely independent cetimateE of
resources. Ttre situation aeems reaeonably eatisfactory in this restrrct. as
the Commiseion makes its own forecaste, compar€s then with thoce of-the
Member States in the cont€xt of the Ldvisorv Corunittee on the Comunity's
own Resources and then adopts the final estimates quite indelrndcntly.
19. It remains
the means to verify
States) on which its
is coneidered later.
to be seen to what extent the Cormisaion PoeseEse!
the accurac,y of the data (Provided by the t'lernber
own forecasta are baeed: the problem of instrrction
(b) !{akinq ovrn resourcee available to the Commission
-----E---
20. The own resources indentified by the Member States are credited
to the Comnission's account with the natlonal treasuries on the baEis of
the sums actually collected, in the case of customo duties and levies, and
by monthly twelfths (twelfths of th€ total annual forecast) in the case
of VAT.
21. Article L2 of the regulation implenenting the ryst€m of, own
resourcegl states that:
'1ltre Conmission shall draw on the eums credited to the
accountE referred to in Article 9(1) to the extent
neceasary to cover itE cash reaource requirenente
arising out of the implementation of the budget'.
22. fn its present form the text iE capable of guarnateeing a InGaEur€
of genuine financial autonomy for the cotmiesLon (and Uy extengion the
Community) in the form of an automatic drawing right - provided the
reference to 'cash resource requirements' does not require the Cotmriasion
to justify its withdrawals nor authorizc the l,tenrber States to check that
they have been made in a pro;rr manner (this inelrction function being
the exclusive preserve of the European court of Auditors).
1 Reguration No. zestltl of 19. L2.Lg77 - o., L 336, p. L, 27 -L2.Lg7?
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23. Clearly ordn resourcee should no longor be ehorm in the national
budgets, as cotrmunity legielation (namely the decision of, 21 April 1980)
authorizes the principle of direct collection of Euch reooutrcGa bV the
Community and the Commrnity budget laye dorn the annual anount.
24. To include comunity resourceg in national budgets would be not
only illega1 but dangerous aa these r€solrrceB night then becone detrrndcnt
on the fate of nationaL finance. lItre situation in the varioue t'Icmber
States is not very clear in this reapect; EorlE aeen to trrrciet in ahoring
different types of, mn reEources in som forrn or another in thei r
national budgete wi.th thc r€ault that thesa raaourcer are eubject to formal
approval by the national parliamenta.
25. ilhe Commiasion ghould carry out a detailed study of the aituation
and, where necesgary, aak l.lenber Stater to fall into linc, on tba
understanding that national parliamntE uay still and irrdecd should b€
kept duly inforned of the amount of rcvenue allocatcd each year to the
Community.
IV. INSPECTIOT MEISTBBS F(B TTIB COI.TSCTION OF OWN RBSqN,CBS
26. It is in the Comnunity'B own bett intereets to have available
reliable own resources i.e. reaourc€s which have been accurataly checked.
As matt€rs stand at pr€E€nt the inspection E€aaures do not app€ar aatirfact-
ory as it would seem that resourceE are not alwaya properly collected and
Community povrers of inepection rculd app€ar to be too linited.
27. Ttre working party coul thersfore propog€ a number of meagurea
to improve the situations
( a ) Proper_g9ll99gi9g_99_g9 gggEgg g
24. Although the CoumiEeion urdoubtedly receivee all the orln
resources collected hry tha I'tenber Statae, there is no certainty that the
latt€r actually collect a1l the aums they ehould.
29. There is clearly a risk that the relevant national adnintatrations
will show less vigour in collecting trade-linked own reaources as thcse
resources are paid wholly to th€ Community. fhie lack of vigour can lead
not only to a logs of Cornmunitlz resources but alao aIlm fraudulent practicea
(e.9. on refunds) to take place on a large Esal€, which are both cxpenaiv,e
and adversely affect the Community's image.
30. No such lack of, vigoug ie evidcnt in the case of, VAT ae the major
share of the revenue yielded [r this tax goes to the ]tember Stat6E.
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They are, however, great differcnces in the effectivenege of the inetrrction
machinery in the various tbmb€r States and it is knorf,n that in tona VAT
fraud may account for 20 to 3@6 of the national tax yicld. llhia is a
serious situation as it may lead to a definite imbalance in the
contributions of the various l{ember States, making some reluctant to agree
to increase the Community rate of \IAT or even to oppose th€ very principle
of the tax.
(u ) lgsgssilx-egsers-9! 
-i!:Egs!igr
31. PurEuant to the existing legal texts (particularly the regulation
implcmenting the system gf own resources referred to above), responslbility
for eneuring that these resources are prop€rly collected mainly falls to
the l{ember States.
Itre Commission may, however, ask for. additional inspection maasures,
which it may be involved, and can also request that certain doculpnts
forwarded to it.
32. The Court of Auditors has much wider po'hrers but exerciseE thege in
and as part of a poEterioriconjunction with national inspectorates
verif icat[ on procedures.
33. A11 in all therefore the Commission is not able to carry out rapid
and widespread checks on the collection of own resources.
in
be
34.
(c) working_p3I!Y_pl989g3lg
The Comnission's polrrers of independent ingPection'over levles
and customE duti- muet be strengthened by providing it with the legal
and material means to establish permanent inspectorates on the terrltory
of the l,{ember States which would have the same powerE of investigation in
res;rct of documents and premises as those of national inepectoratea.
These inspection tn€asures would concentrate on the supervision of revenue
collection and could be carried out by a small number of senior etaff.
3s. llhe problem of \rAT is less straightforward as this is essentially
a national tax and inspection takes place at the level of the taxpayere.
Efforts should therefore be eoncentrated on harmonizing national collectiorl
and inspection rules - on the bagrs of Commisaion pro;rcsals modelled on the
most advanced national systems. National rules on collection and inspection
of trade-linked ovrn resources ghould alEo be harmonized.
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V. PARA-PISCII, RESG'RCES
36. In addition to the traditional type of trn r€aourc€a considered so
far, the working party should also look at the problams raiaed bU thc
recent developent of what may be called para-flecal ComrnunLty rcrourcte.
ta ) g!39-!s-E:1!g-H-eg=e:Eigs31-!3r9e?
37. fhis term ie gcnetally applied to all thoee tax€B which f,all
outsidE the gcncral budgetpry ru1ee. Para-figcal taxeg may be charactcrlzad
as followg:
- the deciaion in pfinciple, to intr6duce thege tax€!, the rate
of tax and the us€ to which ttre revenu. 
"ooroir,g there from ia put ar6 not
aubject to parllilntary atrproval in tha ranc uay ae ordinary taxee, but
are decided by the exeoutive alonc;
- the yiel6 f,rom thea€ taxes ia carmarkcd for rtrrcific itclrg
of expenditure and not lunpcd toEether with other rogouteea as th6
pr;inciple of budgetary unincroality and non-r1locatlon of, rsvcnue would
require;
- th6s€ taxes are entsred in the hrdgct in a Bopatatc end diffcfcnt
manner from notrmal revenue andl extrrcnditute.
38. The groundg involved for the introduction of para-fiecal taxea
are usually thoso of fl.ertbillty and convenience. Thcy are clairned to euit
particular tylrs of oconomic or financial gituations which cannot be colvcd
Sr normal budgctary rneana. Saveral Mernber Stetes have introduccd para-
fiscal taxes to varying degrecs.
39. From Parliansnt's point of view these taxea raiee a major probldrn
as they represcnt a serious violation of the principle rhereby the colle@tion
of revenue and the implenentation of exlrnditure requira dernocratic
authorization; the exceptional budgetrry statua of these taxee of,tcn donieg
Farliament any reaL nonit@lng po\,Ers.
(b ) gsuggsilt-eeg g:51gsg]-!creei.-!Ee-s9:rsggsseiIill*-I:s-gs-Sil+
40. fn thc Comlnity'contGxt there ig at trEeesnt only onc para-fiaeal
tax, the co-responslbility levy on milk production.
Operation of the co-responsibilitv le\rv
41. this lerry was introduced in 1977 byr a Council reEulationl which
provides for the rate of the levy and implernenting arrangements to be
adopted annually in the forn of, a regulation as part of the annual
agricultural pri.ce revlew. lltre lega1 baeig for the regrulation which cover6
' Regulation of L7.5.L977 - O,, L 131, 26.5.L977, P.6.
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only milk production is Article 4o(3) of the EEc lteatyl. In principle
the yield from thie tax is allocated to meet expenditure of a specific
hature intended to promote the development of outlets for milk producte.
These''resources'are entered - as negative expenditure - in the chapter of
the budget devoted to exlrnditure in the milk sector. llheir utllization
is recorded in Eeparate accounts governed trlr eP€cial rules.
42.
The leqa1 poeition
Ttre legal statue of this levy is not very clear. A judgement
handed down b1r the Court of Juetlce on 21 February 1979 confirned that
the tax was lega1 in principle on the basig of ArticLe 40 of the EEC
Treaty and that taxes of this type could be introduced in the context of
the common organization of markets without reeourae to the procedure laid
down for the creation of ne!{ resources (Article 2O1 of the EEC TreaBr).
The Court did not give a ruling on the problem of the budgetization of, thiE
Ievlr, nor a fortiori on its democratic legitimacy.
The Court of Auditore in its report on the budget for the 1978
financial year criticized the inclusion of this tax in the budget as a
negative iten of expenditure, the utilization of which was not subject to
any of the rules laid down in the Financial Regulation.
The qrowinq problem of the eo-responsibilitv lernr
43. This levy, which was originally introduced for a three-year Period,
now seems to have acquired a permanent status and has becorne one of the
main factors in the policy of balancing Comrnunity extrlnditure in the
milk sector. In addition, the lety, which originally produced a emall yield,
now brings in some 5oo nillion EUA2. lltre poEsibility is now being discussEd
of extending the concept of a special levy on production to other agricultural
sectors (particularly production of alcohol), or even to non-agricultural
products (e.9. Communlty levy on oil).
Articlr 4O(3) of the EEc Treatv
'1fhe common organization eatablished in accordance with paragraph 2
may include all rneasuresr required to attain the obJectives set out inin Article 39, in particular regulation of pricee, aids for the
production and marketing of the various products, storage and carry over
arrangenents and conmon machinery for gtabilizing imports inports or extrrcrta'
Eguivalent to a rate of 1.5% (!ee th€ Conrnigsion's propoeala for the 1980,/81
markating year).
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44.
( c ) !9s!!gg-E3r-gr-PE9E993Is
Facedl with this situation and with
crosion of the European Parliament's trtr€ra
vrithout roprcaentation', th€ working party
remediee:
a view to littiting the
by this type of 'taxation
could proposc the folloring
(1) reEtriction of para-fiecal taxee to agricultqre,
(2) introduetion of such taxes and establiEhmcnt of their
annual rate by means of'legialative conciliation'
between Parliarnent and the Council;
(3) budgctization. - in an ann€x to the general budget -
of rev€nue and expendituro relating to euch taxee;
(4) approval by the budgetary authority in accordance with
the etandard procedure of the varioue forms of exlrnditure
to wtrich the revenue accruing frst auch taxeg ia applicd.
VI. FINANCHI, RESfiJRCES OF 
.EE ECSC
45. As pert of lts asaeaarrcnt of the pr,esent systen of Cmmunity own
resources the working party Ehould exami,ne thc problama raised \l the
present state of d,epletion of ECSC financial retourc€a and put forward
its propoeals for rernedying the situation.
( a ) Pes!e!le!-eg-EgE9-I1E9esigl-s: ggg:seg
46. The eerious financial crisis to which the Cotmunlty'e coal and
steel induetry has been exposed sinee 1970 haa highlightsd the inadcquacy
of the financial reEourcea available to the ECSC to cope with the crisie.
47. The main source of ECSC r€venue is of coura€ the levy on the
produetion of coal and stesl up to the l*.ceiling on thc agrcod aBBaalscht
basis.
4a. B€cauae of the financial cririe facing thoo€ com4ranies uhich are
subject to the levy, the rate has remained fixcd at O.2|I% cincc the
beginning of 19ZOI 
- eguivalent to a yield of about lOO million EUA - ard
the EcSc has therefore becn unable to otstain adequata funds to provide
effective assiatance to these undertakings. notably by carrying out the
modernization, conversion and readaptation meagures provided for in the
ECSC Treaty.
49. tfhile the ECSC has bocn able blr borrotring and lending operations
to make a poaitirre contribution to the efforta of individual undertakinge
I R"a" increased to o.31% in L98o
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and th€ ltember StateE, even here the lack of resources raiacd from taxation
has rcatricted its contrlbution, in particular by rcducl.ng tho 1cvcl of
interest rate relief available on certain typee of loang.
(b) Poseible Eolutions
50. llhe Commiseion haa tried, albeit rather late, in the day, to cotn€
up with solutions to the financial crieie.
51. In }lay 1978 it proposed that the l,bmber States Ehould allocate '
to the ECSC tha yield from custome dutiee on imported coal and Eteel
products. Paradoxically, these dutieE - eetimated to be worth aorne 60 Uillion
EUA a year - accrue to the Membcr Statee, whereas all other customa duties
are of course paid to the Community. Itre Council did not act on thie
proposal for a variety of reason8 on€ of which was the very un€qual diatrib-
ution of duties anong thc t{ember Stat€E (one Member State accounted for
almost 5@" of the total).
52. ltlore recently, in May 1979, the commission propoacd allocating to
the ECSC a total of lOO nillion EUA to finance slrcial tcrq)orary allowanccE
for workere in the steel induetry. lltris arnount would have been credlted
first to the EEC budget and then tranaferred to the ECSC budget. Once again
the Council did not act on the proposal, which in any case would not have
Eo1ved the general problem of financing th€ ECSC but would rneroly have
increased its resourcee for the provieion of social ald.
53. Under these circumetances the Commission haE been forced to reaort
to a temporary exPedient. It requeEted and obtained the approval of the
'fepresentatives of the governments meeting in the Council' for national
contributionE in the form of donations to the ECSC. In the L978/79 finandrl
years theee contributione paid by lrlember States according to an ad hoc
seale totalled 28 million EUA. lltrere iE no need to amphaaise the inadcquacy
of and lack of Community spirit implicit in Euch donationE.
( c ) 3be-:glgligl-egggs3leg 
-Er-E3rli3ses!
54. Parliament was guick to coneider the financial problcns facing
the ECSC and rapidly reached the conclueion that the only laeting solution
to the structural financial criais facing the ECSC was to bring the EEC
and ECSC budgete cloeer togcther or to be more preclse to votc an annual
eulaidy in the context of the EBC budget which would th€n b€ tranefcrred to
1the ECSC budget-.
55. Af,ter much hesitatlon, nrainly on lcaal grounds, thc Conunlacion took
up this proposal in the f,ramework of the ECSC budget for I98O but felt that a
Council regulation baeed on Article 235 EEC wae neceesary bcfore thc tranafer
could be effected; it also asked the budgetary authority to give ita oplnion
- Reporte of the Europ€an Parliatn€nt on the ECSC budgeta for
1977/L978/L979 and the r€port of the Europcan parllanrent
on certain budgetary questions (Doc.150/78)
\>:" I.,\
\
aa roon ae DqisiUle on the principlee of euch a trangfcr.
56.
( o ) tg:tlee I:r_!1 _pr_9po-:,113
In thq light of the above conaiderations, thc uorking party could
financing problcmsput forward the follwing protrroaalo to renady the
facing the ICSC:
th€ proposal to make available to th€ ECSC the ryEgg
accruing from cuetons dutLee on imtrnrta of coal and etocl
products ia wholly. juetifiecl. 'iltre Council nust gtivc thLs
protrncal gerious consideration in the framcwork\of a
conciliation procedure with Parliament, which thc latt r
ahould take atepe to initlate as Eoon lE trnttlblc;
th€ propoaal to transfer to the ECSC on 1g3.}.g!g![.
frour the EBC budget is entircly juatified. Ihe lcvcl of,
thc aubridy must be decided by the budget rrd authority ln
the framework of the budget procedurc and oa thc baris of
the ECSC'g reEidual financing rcquiremcntg. Ihe High
Authority muat be frce to decide hon the cubeidy ahouldl be
spont. Itre decision on the p.rinciple of such a tranafcr may
be taken b1z the budgetary authority without recouraa to th€
proeadure provided for in Articla 235 of, the EEC lt€aty.
coilEurgllgt
57. Ehc rcrking party might put forward the following propoaah on
the bacis of the above etudy of varioue aspects of, the prescnt syetan of,
Conmunity own rasources s
:
(l) tcchnLcal lmprovctnent of cxlsting' machinery
- by hernonlzlng the entire baais of agacscnsnt for VII and
oxtcnding to all l{embcr Statea the dcclaratlon-barod
collection rnethod by I ilanurry 1983.
(2t s!r-sg!E9si!g-9t-!be-g9ssssl.tr:g- glslsslt}-lgggpg$gss:
- by guaranteeing the Conpission's freadon to preparo
forccasts and the handing over of own trolourc€s,
- by refraining from entering Cornmunity ovn resourcer iS
national f,inance acts.
(1)
(2)
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( 3 ) r!s9!s!Ee!1s:r-ggsEssi !I- isrpgs lies-pe's9Es-is-re :p9s!-9f
the collectlon of own rcaourcog
- by harnnnlzlng national rulea on collection and inalretlon
proceduree in the context of tradc-linked rslourcc!
(Ievies,/customs duties) and ltAT,
- by granting the Comnission thc right and thc tnolna to
cxerciEe direct permanent polrers of inepection over the
collection of trade-linkcd r€soure.E.
( 4 ) 99! !r-9 I I i !s 
- 
!89 
-ge ye lgpge ! g -e g - gggssll H -E!E !:f I rs I l - ! tr: s
- by strictly limitlng para-fitcal taxos to the agrleultural
gector,
- by tollowing the conciliation procedure when introdueing
and fixing the rate of such taxea,
- by enterlng theee taxaa ln a rcparatc rnd dctallcd ntnn r
in the budget and making them wholly aubJect to normal
budgetary approval procedures.
(s) sgsesglEellss-E999-!llesseg
- [t allocating to the ECSC ths r€v€nuc accruing from cuatona
duties on coal and stecl productg; Parliarnent must take
eteps to lnitiate a conciliation proccdure with tte Council
on thie question,
- by transferring to the ECSC a subr{dy from tho'EEC
budget to be determined annually by the Budgetary Authority
in the light of actual reguirements.
-3-!-!-
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III,
thc cmunity,c loan pollcy
Dreftaran: tir J.tt. ItyLOn
PB 6{.63#fi,n.--.ts2 
-
Ilr
I;.
INIR(f,)UCTION
-
, 1. This document derrelops the ideaa contained in the gcctlon of thc
working party's work Prograrm€ relating to loan policy.
2. The principal idca iB that loans Ehould be conaldcred aa a un!!Iu9- Il4
of or.rn reEource. Ihstead of relying ontirely on r€venue provlded by the
taxpaycr the corurunity can catalyse certain tlpee of doeLrable activlty
with nonry borrorod on the capital marketa and then lcnt to publtc and
private ecctorg. ftrat is making things happen that would not othawlge
happcn. ("Howevc thesa loan fLnancing operationa .... are not to br con-
fused with budgctary erpcndLture. lftrc lattcr may supply, howcvar, lntcrost-
ratc strbsldlcr on th. forncr": l,lacDougall Roport).
3. Indeed, thc Cdnrunlty has frcm the outsct bccn involvcd Ln thc varloua
financlal actLvltlca providod for apltcttly ln thc ECSC and Errratcm Trratloa
and lmpllcitly Ln the EEC Trcaty.
4. Ttre purposc of this report Ls to e:cunlne to what ortcnt, and in what
uay, graater use could be made of loana to fLnancc certain typo of
Corununlty actl.on.
5. After a bricf dcrcrLptl.on of thc preeent sLtuatlon, thc raport w111:
- 
re-state thc Europcan Parlianent's attltude to csununity loang,
- sh@, that thiE sGctor should and can be dcvelopad,
- 
put fonrard practical proposals for this PurPos€.
o
ooI. COD[.{[,NIIY IOAN MECHANIS!,IS
6. Ttrere are at Pretent five separate loan mchanisms:
- ECSC loans for investment in the coal and iron and atccl industrioc;
- Euratom loanr for the production of nuclear electricifir,
- Corununity loans (EEC) for ltenber Statqs with balancG of paymenta
difficultieg reaulting from the oil-price incrca!€!,
- inysstment loang (EEC) to prorrote inveatnent within th€ Comunity
(alEo refcrred to aa NCI loane),
- EIB loane for regional development, the pronotion of undortakLnga
and projecte involving aeveral Member Statea.
7. A schematlc table of these mechanirms ls annexed to thia report.
- 
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8,. Ehr t hI6 dtrs*s that:
- the commn*ty bofnqr r anbttrati.ar mo**t arch yalrr
Financial voar 1979
ECSC
Euratom
Community loanE (1927)
Invc..tEnt losnB (BIC)
EIB
(m EIIA)
957
16s
1,816
L77
2,48O
Iotal 5,595
Budgctlry ann rG.ourccs for the 1979 financial year totallcd tr4r5g4 m ,' ,
EUt 
' R..ouacc arratlrblr fso borrodng -nLL trrarfrmErIveIG[ tD rtourd ' -- I
3876 of thr Cmnnltyrr tax rcyaurci
- th€ atructuro and nanagoeent of tha oxl.cttng lo.n mchani.me vtr1l ridclygince they wcra rct up and have devarolrdr quit€ indapendcntry;
- all tho rcncy'borrorred is uaod to finanea Ioang and not non:r€fundable'
subsidieg. r.aving acide lntcreat rete auboidies and fl.nanciar oqnnare,
loans raiccd by thc conrunity are thcrofore neutrar trancactione involving
no actual cxpenditure by th€ Cmunity, rtrich sluply actg ,aa an intcrmdiary.
o
oo
II. PARLIIIIENT,B AETffiTDE tg InAN pOLXCy
9. Slnce 1975, ryhon EurElom 1oanc were introducad, parlianant has follmrcd
cloaery thc davcrolmlnt of the varioue borrorring,/rending npchaniama anil hre
thue gradually eatablirhed a firm poattlon on loan poticyl.
10. fn gcneral, ?erllamnt ll in farrour Of borrgning to obtain r€aoutcesto flnance eortein tyF.r of cmmunlty actron. rt f,corr thrtr
- by borrorlng lt la pomlblo to &taln srrbrtentLar rorourtc.
needed to finanec investmnt projocta capable of reducLng the diaparler
between the revcls of deveJ.olment of thc variour comunity rcaionrl
' :?"-in particular the lat€Bt roport (I9?g) on the inter-inetitutlonaldialogue on ccrtaln budgctary queatione (Doe. tSd/til
\
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- borrowlng La a floclblc mothod of financlng, partieularly wcll adagtcd to
fLnancing thc productivc aotlvitios whLch thc cmunlty rIlI bt incrcartngly
callcd upon to undcrtakcl ctpcclally ln problor gectors whcrc a CoFqrnity-
Ievel solution Ls needed;
- recourae to borrowing is in line with the principte of the Corurunity'e
financial indetrrndence.
II. Parliament nevertheless conai.ders that greater rccoursc to borrowing
must be eubject to two conditionas Conmunlty loan policy mugt be both
rationalizcd and controlled. 'iltrese tx,ro aspecto are briefly diseugeed
below.
1. Eelie$lrs3!!e!-e!-lhe-less-eelisx
L2. Reference has already been made to the divereity of the existing
mechanisms. Itris has several drawbacka:
- the lack of an ovcrall picture of the Conununity's need for funde ard
its capacity to borrow; this prevente the formation of a genuine
Ioan policy and gives rise to uncertainty about the poaition of loans
.in relation to tax revenuei
- 
diepcraal of recponsibility for deciEion-making and managcment
between various departmentg and institutlons;
- 
an uncoordinated approach to the major capital market which ia likcly
to create confusion harmful to the Community's internatlonal crcdit
standing.
13. Parliament recommended ome degree of unification of the mechanisma which
are the responsibllity of the Conununity institutions proper and more syetematic
coordination betwean this unified meehaniem and the EIB's otrrrations.
14. fhis solution obviously raises a number of probleme connected with the
existence of separate Treaties and regulationg, which perhape explaine the
Commission's lack of enthusiasm lvith regard to Parliament's propoaed
rationa lization.
15. Parllament is neverthelegs convinced that, in view of the lack of
coordination between the mechanisms, it is imposeible, either to makc maximum
use of or to dcvclop borrowing,/X.ending operationa. It ghould thcrcfore
again request the conniselon to review the exieting eystem and to fornulate
a genuine loan policy baeed on ne\,, principles.
2- ge!9r9l-eg-gEe-Ie3s-PgIisx
16. If thie policy.is to be developed, it muet remain aubject to adcqultc
political and budgetary control.
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PoIitical control
17. Parliamant hae in the past made quite
policy should be controllcd by the varioue
hae proposed is as follorre:
clear the way in wtrlch loan
inetitutions. Itre ryatcn lt
on a proposal frorn the Cormission and after conciliation with Parliamcnt,
the Council decidcg to raise a loan to finance a particular naaaursi
it also decides the general framework for the loan operationa;
subject to a celling which it fixes annually, the budgetary authoriQr
authorizeE recourse to borror.ring and lending (see belor) ;
the commiesion aolutrns full responsibility for managemant, that is, it
decides on indlvldual borroring and lending op.retione wlthin the annurl
budgetary allocation;
- 
in addition to its qrvn activities as dcfined in Articlc 130 of the BEC
Treaty, the EIB assists the Comniasion in its task of managcm.nt without
infringing on the latter'e initiative and responeibility.
Budqetarv control
18. Since 1975 Parliament has inEigted that ttre Community'e borrowing,/lcnilinE
otrrratione (wlth the exception of the EIB's activities) ahould be entcrcd in
the budget and thug controlled each year by the budgetary authority. It
therefore proposed the creation of a capital budget which would forn the
seeond part of the general budget of the Comnunities and whose adoption
would be Eubject to the relevant rules la.j.d dortrn in the lteatieE.
19.The capital budget hae exiEted in an embryonic and unaatirfactory form
since L977. Itre council and Parliamcnt are currently considcring waye of
improving it as part of the concillation procedure relating to the revieion
of the Financial Regfulation. It ig therefore gufficient to point out that
the budgetization of loans Ehould enable ttre budgetary authority:
- to authorize borrowing,/lending operations each y6ar on the barla of thc
ruleg in force and of actual reguirernents;
- to be kept informed during the year of the implernentation of, theee
operations;
- to verify in retroepect, during the diEcharg€ procedure, that the op€ra-
tions have been mancged in a sound and proper manner.
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20. parliarcnt tskce thc vicw that thG developmnt of foan'potitt'-tEuat
t1p rsrr{pat to thLr dutt control (political and budgetary) in vlow of thc
volume of opcratiom flnanced in this uay, the nature of thc nrcasur.a
involved (energyr cconomie lnfragtructures, regional devclopment, etc.),
lhe resulting community debt and the fact that repayrnent ie guarantccd
by the ordinary budgeE.
ZL. parliament Bhou1d thcrefore reiteraLe its detraads to the Commlraion
and the Councll to enaure that its proposala in thLs fieldl are taken
lnto account.
o
oo
rII. THE DBVELOP}GNT OF LolN POLICY: NECFSSARY AND IIEASIBI,E
22. Rcaources obtilned through borroring must comPletrent and not rc-
ptace rcvcnue from taxca. Ttrig principlc muat ba clcarly eEatcd at thg
outsct.
23. Thc raajority of tlrc mcaruree at prriot flnaacd f,rm thc Or..rxrre.8
of ths ordinary laOgrt oould not bc f,inanccd by bomou"Ing, elnoa tllil triivoli6-
non-rafundablo sublldlce. It c6rlld hcrwGvca -Pircndd. naw-
resourccs better euited to financing other rmalure!, thc nccd for whlch
ls norrt belng fclt.
Neceasarv
24. For rcasons connected with the trcnd in thc proccas of lntcgration,
the general economlc eit\ration in the tlsrnbar Statcs and tho wldening of
the disparity betucn their levele of developlEnt, the CommunLty haa
bcen obliged to adopt a new policy designcd to promote productivc
investment and to achievc thq convergence of the natbnal oconomles.
25. Etris pollcy covers eerrcral sectors, includin$ encr$tr induatry and
transport. Since the investlront projecte in tlrese sectors drlch are
ellgible for Communlty aid have both productive and comnprclal objectivcs,
lt would bc unreaeonable for thc aid to conaigt soleJ.y of aubel'dice
financed from thc Community's tax revenue. It wOuld be morO appropriatc
t,o have recourae to loana financed by bOrrorring, Posaibly at rOduced
interest ratcg.
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26. Ehe fodthedning acccssion to thc CuunrnLty of corntrl,cl whos€ oconoicg
are' 
.Gtpanding 
rapldly wlll increace etlll firrtha thc necd for flnanclng
obtained through borrowing/lendlng. In thc long-tcnr, thLs ucclranLcu uight
algo be uscd to BuP1rort a counter-cyclical pollcy dcsigncd to attcnuatc the
cf,fecte of the econquic cycle ln the varLous l{anbsr statogl.
Foasible
27 - The conurunity haa already gaincd eongidsabla orpericncc ln thc f,l,nancial
Bactor through the a:cLeting mechaniema.2 ltlorGover, the Comgnity cnJoya a
gfiood reputatlon on tho Lnternational capital markete Ln reepcct of its eound
nlanagcnent and thc qualLty of Lts financial guarantces.
28. It is thcrcfono llkely that a eubstantLal Lncrcage in thc Ccnmrenltyra
loan actlvLtiea would be woll recgivcd by thc princLpal Lntenational
flnancial markete. fhac ie cven a poesibl.lity that cmunlty Lntcrv:ntion
on those markets wqrrd be more dccieive and morc cf,fcctivc than the
individual and eompctttivc measurcs taken by the l{aba Stato or national
loan bodics (treaturiee, batrlcs, gdrl,ic entcrprlaog, ctc.), elnca thc Counrnlty
is ln a better poaltion to cmpotc, for orarqrlc, for petro-dollare, agalnrt
the major thlrd countrLoe (Unitcd Statcs and ifapan). In thle connectlon,
there iE much to be lcarned frorn the Comunl.ty'a activLtloe in uaJor iht€r.-
national trada nrEotiatlonB.
lsce in thig conncction the conclueions of the lilacDougal stury grotrps TtraMacDougal rqort utgGa thc cqmnrnlty to consldc ,tllnltGd Uoir&tng lroy.rg
_(for relatively short periode) to avoid a pro-cyclLeal lnflurnco fioin tfrcbudget, and to llean Ln thc rlght dlrcction' ao far ae thc gqrsral thruetof coordlnatod natlonal conJunctural policice La conesrncd :....:, But thc
same rePort cautione that "ft ig hard to envlsage the adcquate ddt fLnancingpower and mcchanl.smg which a Cmrunity anti-c1rcIl.ca1 budgctary pollcy wouldrequire, in a francwot'lt vhsc cqrtrol of nonotary poltcy-ana iciccc to thcIttqrrbor states' capital narkctr arc Jcalouely graraca naltonal preogatlvcc',
2TL. ol-,orandun on tht ?ropored Sccond NCr tranchc Cott(gO) 20 flnal hat thlato say: "ExpciOnoe wl.thtrlre f,lrct tranche har daonstrat.d th,o ucofulncrgof the new lnetrumcnt. Bhe CqrtnunLty,s borrowLng capaclly hae addedstgnlflcantly to th9 lncentlvc to invistncni tn trrc g-ectori choacr forpriority attcntLon.
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rv. PR,OPOSAT,S FG, DEVELOPING BSROTYING./:,ENDTNG POLTCY
29. As pointed out above (point 8), money borrored by thc Corununlty ln
the context of the orietlng mechanLsms Ls used c:<clusivaly to finance
loans to privatc and public bodica in the Mariber States. lfhe Cmnunlty
takes the initiative and acts aB an intermediary betwecn the capital
markets and the LnveEtora; it also provides eecurity and guarantees
and, in e:<ceptional cas€s, finances th€ interest rcbates grantid to
certain borroware.I
30. Hence the cumunity does not use thc moncy it borrows to finance
non-refundable subsidies, which are comnonly used by the llabea Statee
as part of theLr deflcit apending pollcy.
31. lltre worklng party fcels that, under preEcnt conaftfona, the Cmnunity
. 
should limit ite financial activities to balanced oparatlona of borrorrlnq
and lendinq - and ghould not borrow money with a vicw to flnancing sorne
itcnrs of oqlenditure or to balancing ite accounts. Eorber, thLe
posslbillty ahould not be daflnitlvely discounted - and could be
rc-o<amined at a later etage.
32. on thie baeie Connrunity borrorring/lcnding policy could develop along
the folloning broad lines;
Total volume
33. Taking account of the Cormunity's reguirancnts and thc funds available
to it and of the situation on thc international financial markets, Cmrnunity
borroring/Iending activltice (otcluding EIB) should gnor rapLdly to an
average annual volume of around 5,OOO million EUA.2
1EIB and NCI loang to beneficiariee in Italy or Ireland rnay bc eubsidLzGdto a maximum of 2oo rn EUA each year. fhase aubeldicg aro connccted wLth
thc introductlon of the E!{Ei.
2see in Annex 2 more detailed considerations on thls point.
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34. Thia flgrure mey at fLret eight seur hl.gh but it reprcaenta the
minimunr which many fecl nocoaaaty to puraucr at CmunLty lqrrel, a n.w
gomnon policlr of thc kind defined above (pointe 24 to 261 aimcd at
Ilrdlloting investmant and roducl,ng the divergenc€ betwecn thc national
economLes.
35. Ttre working party believee that the a*rnrar,wirr noc.rr"oo"te"
Eny non-?olltlca1 dtlfloulttra in &tatntng lhrro r..ouac.r on Ebc f,lnanclal
parkets or in selecting projecta rcguiring an equirralent volum of
finance.
I 
-EreeBU 
=Eeseg -reg -gSIEEIIEI-EE -Ieas -egttex
36. The new rmchanism should be as broadly baeed as ;natiblc in th.t it
Ehould provi4e financing for an extrernelv wide rang€ of inyeatnantg
which are of benefit to th6 generar publtc (energy, induatry, trrnsport,
comrnunications, atc. ) .
37 ' The nrechanism ehould also be used to finance loans which refloct r
specific policy of economic development at Comnunity lerrel. It should not
deviaed unilaterally by
the Mernber statee (which may ba uncoordinat"a 
"iffion wrtheach other) 
- This dcveloprmnE policy should be dcfincd by the couneil
and Parliament on a propolal from the comnigqion, ntrich would alro bo
reeponsible for ite iruplenrntation.
An adeguate financial incentive
38. Although by their very nature Conmurity loane can bc uaed only to
finance productive inrrestmnta, it is highly deairable that the loani
should be aecompanied by financiar advantagar utrLch wLll encourage
investors to apply f,or thcm.
-50- EE 4.634/fln.
39. rn particular, the roans shourd, as a general rule , carry interegt
rebatee financed by the codmunity budget and at a rate rrarying (for
example from 1% to 5%) in accordance with the type of project involned.
40. rnvestors should automatically be granted reasonabre exchange
guarantees to be provided by the Community Urrar-
Er!e.!,ergs 
-ef_ _!Ee- _EgI_
41. The New community rnstrument (investuent loane), set up in Lg1g,
clearly nects to a large extent the conditions outlined above and could
therefore form the basie for tlE recomnended devel-opment of Community
loan pollcy.
42. Holever, the working party feels that substantial modificatlone
are required, not only as regards its overall financial volune (the NCI
is subject to a ceiling of 1,000 mirlion EuA) but also in the right of
the reeervations expreseed by the European Parliament when the basic'
reguration !{aa adopted. At that tinE parliament reguested,that:
- the system should be established on a permanent basis,
- the concePt of loan tranches opened by Council decision should be
eliminated,
- the commission should retain ultimate responsibility for the loan
operations, with the ErB acting merely in a technical and inter-
mediary capacity.
43. The NCI should be accomSnnied by the financial incentives recomrngn-
ded by the working party (interest rebates and exchange guarantees).
44. Ttre regulation estabrishing the NCr provides for a review of the
system before the end of the 1980 financial year. Etre ideas put forward
above could be taken into consideration on that occasion.
t 
-Ergpe ge r- i - -EEe -sEelgrgs -9E - -e_9, _Eelee
45. The working Party is not required to draft detailed technical pro-
poeals but simply to submit suggestions baaed on a;nrticular politlcal
conception of the way in which th€ community could use the loan machaniam.
46. Ttre working party feels that the generar public shotrld be given
greater oppbrtunities of subscribing to community loans. For example,
subject to eertain conditions, EC loans could be moderled on the
system of gorrernment loans used in the Member Statee.
-s] - pE 64.634 /ftn.
47. Such EC bonds would thue:
- be to a large extent open to pubric subscription (through the banks
and the various credit organizations) in the form of bonds at a lorrunit price (for example 100 or 2OO E[IA)1,
- issued simurtaneousry throughout the community financial market,
- Lf poaaibre dcnomr.natcd rn ECU and hencc indeercd,
- 
guaranteed by the Community budget.
48- rn addition to the financiar adrnntages of such a mechanism (inparticular a reductionln the EC,s external debt), it could develop adirect and practicar intereet among the generar public in the construc_tion of Burope and increase the feering of community solidarity amongits citizens.
r cffimmunity loanspublic subscription but ii a verystricts access to a tiny minority
are already open to
vitrich in practice re-
saver8.
(EIB and ECSC)limited form
of individr:a1
-52- PB 5a.5g4lfin.
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CONCLUSIONS
49. The following conclusions could be drawn from thie document for
the purpose of drafting the working party'E final report:
I. Confirmation of the favourable opinions expressed by parliament
in the past with regard to the deveropment of loan policy,
provided that it is satisfactorily rationalized and controlled;
2- loan policy must be deveroped to finance policies aimed at
promoting productive investrent and reducing the divergence
between the national economies;
3. such deveropment is feasible in view both of the experience and
reeults arready obtained in this aector and of the potentlal
for Cornmunity intervention on the international. capital fiarkets;
4. as conceived at present, Community borrowing,/Iending operations
shourd exSnnd considerably to reach an average annual vorume of
around 5,000 million EUA;
5. this increase should rnake it poseibre to finance aE wide a
range of investrEnts as possible in accordance with a specific
community economic development policy. Financial incentives and
guarantees should be offered to investors;
6. the development of roan poricy could be based on the existing
NCI mechanism, subject to the modifications recommended by par-
liarent when it vas introducGd;
7. in vLew of their financial and political advantages, EC bonde
should be offered directly for subscription by private inveetors.
-53-
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ANNEX 1
SUTIIIARY TAB[,8 OF
COM!{,}IITY BORROT'IING AND LENDING OPEF.ATIOT{S
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atom Treaty(Art. 172 para. 4)
and Council decis
Borrorings are
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A![!gpt 2
The croup conslderE that the loan issue capacity of ttre couunity
should be raiaed to an annual leveL of 5,000m EAU'
This poaitlon should be interpreted in the Iight of ttre f,ollordng:
- 
at present, the averase annual loan-iesue capacitv Of ttre Comrnity
can roughly be put at:
- EIB
- ECSC
- NCI
- EURATO!,!
(!Etn)
2,500
1,000
500
250
4,25OL
- an increaee in the loan catrncity of the Bank - and, to a certain extentr
of the ECSC - ls subject to sPecific, autonomous conditions (for exanple
the positlon of the Bank's capital or of the ECSC gruarantee f,und) I
likewiEe, the uae rnade of theee loans is condlitLoned by epeclfLe regul're-
ments and rules;
- the bulk of the increase advocated bv the Grlcup therefore eoncetna
Euratoro roans and Ncr loans, ttre gggIgre. annuar vorume2 of wlich is
In ttre region of 250m E(A and 500m EIA reapect,ively'
Further[pre,theGrouptakestheviewthatthevolumeadvocated,
1.e. 5,00om EtI{,, ig, Ln community terrne, the ninimrm level requj.rcd Ln
order to launeh a policy of support for productive investrents and that
this voluruc ehould therefore bc increased as eoon as solid foundations
for a conmn polley in ttris field have been laid.
t Lo"rrs dealgmed to asEist Mernlcer StateE with their balances of [n$menta
are of a very speeial tlpe and are not covered here.
a
' Th" regrulationg eetabliehing th ese loans lay dorrrn rener,able ceilingeof SOOfr nrn (Euratom) and I,9OOm EI1x (UCr1. It is to be expected that,
after an Lnitial running-Ln period, these co{linge witl on the baELs
of an annual loan volume of 25Om Etn1 (Euratorn) and 500n EIA (NCI) be
reached - and therefore have to be renewed - roughly every 2 years.
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7. Budqetisation
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The croup consLderE that the Ioan issue capacity of the Conmunity
should be raised to an annual level of 5,000m EAU'
This position ghoulcl be Lnterpreted in the llght of ttre followlng;
- at present, ttre averaqe annual loan-isgue capacitv of the Comtnity
can roughly be put att
. (r{Ern)
- EIB 2,500
- ECSC 1,000
- NCr 500
- EURAIO!,1 250
4,2501
- an increaEe in the loan capacity of the Bank - and, to a certtin extentr
of the ESSC - ie subject to specific, autonomous conditions (for exaryle
the position of the Bank's capitaL or of the ECSC guarantee f,und);
Likewise, the uee made of these loanE is conditioned by speclfLc rcquLre-
ments and rules;
- the bulk of the lncreaEe adrrocated bv the Group therefore concerng
Euratom loang and NCf loans, the 3re. annual volurne2 of trhich lg
l-n the region of 25Om EIB and 500m E(B respectively'
Furtherrpre, the Group takes the view that the volume adrrocated,
1.e. S,OOOm E(Il, 1g, in community terms, the rninimum leve1 required i-n
order to launch a policy of support for productive investrentE and that
thls volume should thereforc be increased aE Boon aa solid foundations
for a comlrcn pollcy Ln ttris field have been laicl.
'l
' Lo.rr" deslgned to asEigt lternlcer States with their balances of trnymenta
are of a very special tlpe and are not covered here.
' ,n" regrulations eetabliehing th eEe loanE lay down renewable ccLlingsot SOOn SItrA (Euratom) and 1,000m Etn| (UCf1 . It ie to be exPocted that
after an initiar running-in period, these coLlings will on tlre baels
of an annual loan volume of 250m EIA (Euratoro) ancl 500n Et[ (NCI) be
reached - and therefore have to be renewed - roughly every 2 yeare.
.- 58 
- 
PE 64.63)/lLn. ?"r .
rv.
redistribution through budgetary measl res
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2.
The need for redlstrlbutlon
I. whllst economlc lntegratlon ls a process whlch 1g certalnly bf beneflt to
the Community ae a whole, lt affords no guarantee that thls beneflt wltl
be shared by all rgglons of the community. rn the extreme case, economlc
lntegratlon may even lead to a drop in the prosperlty of an area wlth a
parti.cularly unfavourable structure.
Redlstrlbutlon between the Member States must be one of the Conununltyrsprlorlty tasks because:
a reductlon of the differences ln per capita income and, economLc
performance ln the reglons i.s a declared alm of the cormrunlty;
large dlfferences in lncome and economlc performance lead to an
undeslrable mlgratlon from poorer to rlcher areas.
Budgetary measures mugt be stepped up where the cohesion of the Comrunlty
needs strengthentng, because they are of prlmary lmportance for the
conmunlty as a whore. There can be rro doubt that a widenlng gap 1n
economic etrength and prosperity between lndlvldual member countrles
w111 Jeopardlze the coheslon of the Communlty.
4. Furthermore, a hlgh degree of worker moblllty encourages excesElve
mlgratlon from poorer to rlcher countrles, causlng conslderable hara toboth. on the one hand, the workersr countrles of origln loee not only
a capable workforce but also the conslderable educatlonal and social
lnvestment whlch they have made. on the other, the reclplent countrieB
also have to comml-t high expendlture to tackle the problems of congegted
areas and too large a ProPortlon of Community cltizens of another tongue.
4a. The polltlcal expectatlons of the communityrs cltlzens lie malnly ln the
Communlty's helplng to deal wlth unemployment and the acute economlc
sltuatlon.
The MacDougall report found that redlstrlbution through publtc apendlng
and taxatlon reduced reglonal lnequaLlties ln per caplta lncome by
approxlmately 40t ln the countrles lt studled whlch had attalned a hlgh
degree of economic integration (Australla, France, usA and the Eederal
Republlc of Germany).
rn contrast, the report stated that the redlstrlbutlve capacLty of the
Communltyrs flnances as between Member states waa very Iow - aroqnd lt.
MacDougall constdered that the reasons fc ,thls were the relatlvely nodeat
Communlty budgetary resources srltable for redlstrlbutlon andl the conse_quently weak geographlcal redlstrlbutlve capaclty per unlt of account.
(a)
(b)
3.
5.
lstrlb.lt
6.
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7. The Councll ln Dublln expressed its determlnation to reinforce those
pollcles most llkeIy to favour the harmonious gror*th of the Member
States, economles and to reduce the dlsparltles between then.
8. Redlstributlon ought to be accorded greater prlorlty wlthln the
structure of the Conununity budget. The vclous lnstrumenLs clescrlbed
ln thls report demonEtrate that redlsE lbtulon ls perfectly feaElble.
9. The Com1sslon takes the vievr that lt ls not posslble systematlcally to
lntroduce a redlstrlbutlve element lnto every slngle sectoral pollcy.
Ho\,vever, the Commlsslon does say that more conslderatlon shoulcl be
glven to thls matter when shaplng or revlewlng policy ln lndlvldual
' sectorg.
Instrgents and thelr redlstrlbutlve effect
IO. The European Councll was of the oplnlon that the convergence of economlc
performances requlred measures for whlch the Member StateE concerned
were prlmartly responslble. Corununlty policles had to play a suPportlng
role wlthln the framewc k of increased solidarlty wlthln the varlous
areas. Steps had to be taken to strengthen the economlc potentlal of the
less prosperous countries of the Community" (European Councll ln Dublln).
11. The present report ls prlmarily concerned with the taskE that the
Communlty,s flnances can accompllsh in order to reduce dlfferenceE ln per
caplta lncome and the structural gap between Member States and/or
indlVldual regions in the eor,munlty. Greater convergence of economic
development in the lndlvtdual Member States is one of the prlnclpal
alms of the Contnunlty.
LZ. Any flnanclal arrangements for redlstrlbutlon must accept the fact that
(a) the sygtem of own resources ls lnvlolab1e, and
(b) no Member State has the rtght to recover all the resources lt has
contrlbuted ('juste retour') .
13. The redlstrlbutive effect of revenue is very s119ht Eince nelther
customs dutles and agrlcultural levles nor contrlbutlons geared to gross
natlonal product lend themselvee to thls klnd of operatlon. OnIy the
calculatlon of value added tax revenue has a certaln redlgtrlbutlve
effect.
14. However, even on the expendlture side there are only a few qulte
speclflc pollcles which can be used to achleve redlstrlbutlon.
15. Wlthln the context of the present Communlty set-up tt would eeen that
the best way to achleve redlstrlbutlon ls to provide grants f,or
speciflc purposes such aa reglonal pollcy or employment asslBtance
programmes. Dtrect redlstrlbutive measures on a broader scale are
Iess appropriate because lasting convergence w111 only be brought
about by changing the structures of the disadvantaged areas. A l@,er
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flnanclal contrlbutlon frqn an lndlvldual Member State or a dlrect
grant not earnarked for any partlcular purpose w111 do nothlng to alter
the economlc Etructure of a dlsadvantaged area.
15. The MacDougall report too arguecl that tnequallty In per caplta lncde
ls reduced by actlvltles ln the fLeld of, Btructural and c1zcl1cal policy.
Reglonal poIlcy, job creation prograrmes and enployment pollcy Ehould,
lt sald, as far as possible ensure that the beneflts of lntegratlon are
enjoyed by all, that the convergence of econonlc development ln all
Member States ghouLd lncrease or that, at least, the dlvergence should
not become wlder.
Hgrlzontal flnancial equalizatLon
17. Accordlng to the MacDougall report, a Eyatem slmilar to the rLtnder-
flnanzausglelchr in Germany, given 2l of the totar groas natlonal
Product of the Conununlty, could ralse the per caplta flscal capaclty of,
the economlcally weaker Member Stateg to a mLnlmum of 95t of the Ccmnunlty
, average.
I8.' In the oplnlon lt lssued on the lt{acDougall report, the Cormlsslon rtt3cd
the questlon whether there would have to be a reallocatlon of, rerpons!.-
bllltles ln the Comunltyrs favour. The Cpnuriseion conElders that a
tranefer of certaln tasks to the Cormunlty could reduce publlc ependlng
and that other expendlture wculd of neceeslty have to be tranaferred
to the Comunlty.
Revenue-ralslnq svgten wlth proqresslve effect
19. In order to meet the demand for an lncrease ln ovrn resourceE and flgcal
eguallzatlon, a proposal has come from many guarters (J,ncludLng the
MacDougall rePort) that a progresslve revenue-ralslng Eource be created.
20. Flrstly, the celllng of the Comunltyre VAT rcvenue would be ralacd
from lS to llt or 2t. Second1y, the VAT revenue should be calculated
uslng a formula wlth bulIt-ln progresglon. The result of thls would be
that Statee wlth a h19h VAT yleld would have to pay a percentage whlch
rose proportlonately more steeply.
2L. The fotmula thus haE two elenents only one of whlch however nced bo
applled ln any one case. The fLrEt is the slze of the Member State,
whlch largely determlnes the leve1 of the VAT yleld so that larger Statee
pay m)re per caplta than the smaller ones. The eecond ls economlc
strength, whlch also hae a declslve lnfluence on VAT yleld, so that the
economlcally atronger States pay tnore per caplta than the weaker onea.
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FIEca! equallzatlon bY rne
ZZ. Several States constructed on the federal princlpLe have a system under
whtch, ln adclltlon to speclflc purpose grants, general purlro8e fd.nanclal
transferE are made from the central goverffnent to the iegtonal Eovlrnment
or there IB horlzontal eguallzatlon between reglonal governments. ,l[heee
equallzatlon arrangements can have a very marked redlstributlve effect.
23. One good example of thlg is the system of flscal equallzatlon carrLed' out
between the federal government and the Land governments in Germany. The
sy8tem comprlses three adjustments to the allocatlon of tax ylelda.
24. (a) Part of the VAT
lts collectlon .
the Liinder to a
whoIe.
revenue ls not dlstrlbuted accordlng to the place of
but it is used to ralse the flsca1 capacity of all
mlnimum of 92t of that of the Federal Republlc as a
25. (b) Further eguallzation ts effected from tax revenues between the
Liinder. The rlcher Liinder (e.g. Hessen and Hamburg) make paymente
to the poorer ones (Rtrelnland-Pfa1z, Sch1eswtg-Ho18teln) untll thelr
flgcal capaclty reaches the m,lnimum of 95t of that of the Federal
Republlc (@')'
26. (c) Flnal1y, the Federal Governnent ralseE, by means of supplementary
grant3, the mlnlmum flscal capaclty of the poorer Liinder by another
28 to 97t of the federal average.
Arquments agalnst general purpoEe grants
27. Redlstrtbutlon between states not earmarked for a speclflc PurPoBe pre-
supposes by its very nature a hlgh degree of economlc and partlcularly
lnBtltutlonal lntegration. In all federatlone whlch effect ath19h
level of rediGtrlbutlon by means of hortzontal non-speclfJ-c grants,.
thc powers of the federated Etates clearly gtve groun4 tp
those of the central government. Those who wlsh to pur8ue the course
of redlstrlbutlon for other than a speclflc purPose, e.9. on the prln-
clple of rJuate retour' ghould loglcally therefce be prepared to have
some of the Menber Statesl soverelgn rlghts transferred to Comnunlty
lnstltutlons.
Zg. The concept of the Comnunity lald down ln the Treatles therefore clearly
does not accord wlth non-speclflc palments to the Member Stateg'
29. OnIy a very extreme sJ.tuatLon could Justlfy a Iimlted scheme of non-
earmarked redlEtrlbution. As an example of thts the I'tacDougall rePort
postulates the case where a Member State may find ltself xrlth le8s than
E5t of the Communltyrs average flscal capaclty. The report EtateE that
such a system mlght ensure for poor, emall- and peripheral Member StateB
standards not too far below those of the maln body of the Cotnmunlty.
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,30. llhe flnanclal mechanlsn set up bythc Counolltegulatlon On 17 lley 1975
provLdea that a llember State whlch flnds ltgelf ln a apeciel eoonomlc
oltuatlon and whoEc flnanclal contrtbutlon,le a dlrproportlonrte burdcn
on lte economy, may rocelve a palarnt from the Comunlty budgct.
31. The condltlone f,or euch a payment are that
(a) the per oaplta gross natlonal product le lesg than 85t of the average
per caplta GNP for the Conmunlty,
(b) the grsrth ratc of the per caplta GNP of the llenber State ln real
termE ls lecs than 120t of the average rate for the Cmunlty, and
(c) the proportLon of the Comnunltyrg lncome nade up by thc l{eobcr
State'g flnanclal contrlbutlqn axceedg that gtaterr Eh&tG of, thc
' Communltyre total GNP by moil than lot.
: 32. Thls flnanclal mechanlem doea not encroach upon the ayatcD of orrt
resourcea slnce tt deflnes a very speclflc exceptlonal slturtlon and
furthermce llnlts the slze of the palment through lddltlonrl provl.elona.
33. The Conmleelon consldcrg that the flnanclal rnschanlgn muit be deVeloped
further glnce lts scope and ef,fect erc too llnlted and hencs the tro
condltLons added aubeequently ehould be abcllrbcd.
34. These oonditlons atres
(a) that the payments nade under the flnanclal nechanlsm.ahall not €xceod
3t of budgetaly expen,fllturel
(b) that thc payment to the Member State concerned shall not exceed the
value tdlded tart patd over by lt or the net trantfere lt shall bs
requlred to make.
Expendlture wlth,hlgh redlsttlbtrttrve effect
35. The MacDougall report glvas partlcula,attentlon to thG fol.loutng
posslble meaaurea to roduoe dlf,ferencet wl.thln thG CpqEtunltys
(a) more erpend!,trrre ln the form of reglonal pollcy alde Xcmplolment
or Lnvestnent, Lncentlveg, publlc tnfrattructure, urban redeveLolmcnt) l
(b) more expendlture for labour market pollclee (vocatLonal tralnlng and
' other enplolment meaeureg) i
(c) a llmlted budget egualJ.zatlon acheme for extremely weak Menber Stateg
whoge fiscal capaclty lies substantlally below ttre Cmunlty everage.
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35. The report then Euggests that a sum of 101000 mIlIlon EUA allocated to
these measures could reduce lnequalltles ln llvlng standards between
Member States by about 10t.
37. The trlacDougall report comes to the concluElon that the maln need f,Or
macro-economlcally slgnlflcant expendLture ls ln the area of structural,
cycIlcal, employment and regJ.onal pollcy.
38. The Commlsslon has lssued a guldellne for expendlture on structural
pollcy llstlng the varloua proJects involved ln order of lmportancs.
Actlon w111 be taken ln the areab of
reglonal pollcy
lntereEt subsldles for poorer countrlea,
employment pollcy, and
pollcy on agricultural structures.
39. The Conmlsslon has also made lt clear that the regourceE for the Reglonal
Fund must be ralsed by an adequate amount and that the regources over and
above the guota-llnked Ehare whtch are at preaent llnlted to 5t of the
Reglonal Fund must also be lncreaEed.
The llnk between redletrlbutlon, aqrlcultural expendlture and the buduhtE
40. There ls a dlrect llnk between ttre convergence of economic perforulnce,
curblng the rlse ln agrlcultural expenditure and enlarglng the fLnanclal
framework. Wtth agrlcultural expendLture contLnulng to rtse, tho room
for manoeuvre wlthin the 18 llmlt for expendlture havlng a redlatrlbutlvo
effect whlch a[ght solve the problernE of convergence le bccornlng
lncreasingly narrow.
4I. The Coranlsslon therefore takes the vlew that the Coaurunltyts alm of
increasLng the share of lts expenditure whlch goes to invegtnent and
structural lmprovement proJects w111 only be reached tf the Coffiiunlty
can succeed ln curblng lts agrlcultural expendlture.
42. The Comrnunltyts expenditure on agrlculture hag no redlstrlbutlve effect
betvreen rlch and poor Member State6, Elnce the obJectlvee lt PurBueE
are purely sectoral ones.
43. As long as budgetary expendlture not Eulted to redlBtrlbutlon ls four
or flve tlmes greater than expendl-ture havlng a redlstrlbutlve effect,
the.convergence called for by CouncLl, CotunlssLon and Parllanent w111
remaln no more than a dlstant prospect.
44. Parllament has accordlngly often stated that Corununlty pollcles ln
thelr present form are lncapable of creatlng the degree of convergence
between the natlonal economles necessary to promote the cohesion and
progreas of the Conmunlty. In ParllamentrE view
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{a) the lnsk of pgnvErgenpe lt'c at tlrr root of ttre Cmunl,tyrs ..riqrt
prablcns, and
(b, the statencnts Dtdc by the Councll on the need for coavcrgonpc have
so fBr borne no fnrLt because of, ttre absanpe of a trnl!.ttcrl ri.ll.
coNcr/ugIoHs
45. In th€ eonvictlon that
- a reductLon of the differencsa in par eapita incolu and scononle
pcrformancr is a declared rlm of tha Conriunlty,
- thc widrning gap i.n econonic ttrcngth rnd pro.p.rity bctmn mubrr
countries will Jeopardis€ th€ @nnunity's aohcrion, and
- the pr€sent redirtributive capacity of tho Cornmunity le lnfLnLtlriul,
the European Parlirm€nt calls for the alm of radiatributlgn to bc
accord€d greater erlority within the atructure of th€ Cgrgunity budgst.
46. rn thc cpnvistipn that
- the Eystom of, own roagureca i.r lnviolabla,
- no Hember Stotc hre the right to rocov€r all the rerources It har
contributed,
- th€ pr€Fent galeulation of value.addad ttx rsvenue har no
redietrlbutive offect,
- non-spacific paymenta to the Dtember gtatoa can achieve a alight
rodiatributive effect only in cxtreme ooicrr and
- large blockc of erpenditure aueh aa thc Agrlcultural Guarrntre Fund
have no redittributlvo effcct and may oven ba counter*productirrc,
the Europ€an Parlianont cal1t for
(a) th€ graduation of value added tax revcnue accordlng to grols doncrtLe
product e:rpreseed in termg of per capita purchaeing pgutr,
(b) the addltional graduation of value added tlx rsvonue according to tho
EizE of population, and
(c) a eubgtantial increarc in the proportion of e:gonditure with a
strong redietributlvt eff€et in the CorutrunLty budget.
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47. rn vieh, of ths fact that tho proportion of community r.yrntrp frof, vl!.m
added tax uttich thc indi.viduar lloqbcr statcc have to eontri.bqtc diffrrr
markedry from the rerpeetive sharc of total gro.r dmettlc prhdogt,- tha
European Perliament propgsrg
(a) correcting the valus addpd tax yiold by a aorfflelcnt ryiBr I radlttrlhiltlvG
effect based on the above- or bel0rrpavorage level 0f grolr doqarttc
prqQuct e;rpreaaed in par capita purchasing poar,
(b) calculnting this coefflcient ln ruch a.uay that eroh fe*lllr Ftrt*,r'
devletlon frqr tha cornnunltjf avcngi'lt establirhcd, end tlrn
(c) increaf,ing, or deereaaing, tha value addoC tr$ asount for orch i.nilirlidual
Ittember State, e:<pre:ned as I0O, by E tenth part of thie dcv{qg1en,
(for aample calculatien, gec Teble I)
48. Jn view of the faqt that ucmber gtttet with }ergcr populatiorre Say bc
relatfvely bpttcr ahie to bcar tha burdcnrHrB Eut'oF6'ffi-ElffiirFFtrFopouE!
(a) correct+n9 the volue addod tox yleia by manr of an additlonal eorfflclent
based on thc abgva- or balotr-avsragc proportlcn of thc tOtif,Cornnunity
population figure,
(b) calculattrE thia oocffl(ri.rrrrln gueh a way that eaeh rh*rr statl,r
devlation fron a national average of 10?6 of the total population--it'
ertabllrhed, Bnd then
(c) increasing, or decreaaing thr vlluc addcd tax rmount for eaoh lndlvldturl
Membgr State, enprceaed ae 100, by a tenth part of thlr dcvlatlon.
(For sample calculation. see Table 2)
49. In tha convietion that
- the aim of redistributian ic bcct aeh*cvocl hy pryncnts fgr qultc
apecific pqrpoaee,
I 
- lastipg convergence will only ba lttained by changing the aconomic and
sociql etructure of dialdvantaged rggienrl
- direot, non-Epeeific grantq do not ohange the economle strueturc of a
rqgion, and
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ti-
- expenditur.'sultsd to rcdistribution forme a much too amall.proportion of
total e:ponditure,
the European Par.liament ealla for a mtrkG'd i.nereare Ln o:qlcndLture ln the
fields of
(a) regional poticy (on cnqltoymcnt and invcetrnsnt incentives, public
. 
infrastrudture, lnd urban redenelopment)
(b) 'employment lrotley (on. vocational trainlng 'and other eryloymcnt meaautcl)
(c) structuril policy and
(d) cyclical policy
- 
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Tab1e 3
Grosa domcatic product
4. 68?6
2.7T4
3L.75%
23.6eA
0.63%
13.4 %
o.L7"A
6,34%
16.6596
Share of population
3.79D6
t.97%
23.56%
20.5510
L.26%
2t.geA
0.14r(
5.3914
2t.451A
t EEc 
"rr"rage
+ 23%
+ 3816
+ 35%
+ t5r6
_ 50,6
_ 38*
+ 2t%
+ lsl
- 22Y"
deviation from 10?(
- 6.2t%
- 8.0316
+ 13.55%
+ I0.55,6
- 8.74%
+ 11.90?(
- 
g.ge6
- 4.6t%
+ 11.45%
coefflclont
LO2.3%
r03.8?6
103. sx
101. 516
95,VA
96.?l
lo2.t%
r01. 896
97.A4
copfflclent
99.4%
9e'nl
101.4%
r0r. r?6
99.1t6
101. a6
s9.0?6
99. str
101.1*
Tho formulas combined
Be lgium
D€nmark
G€rmany
Franc€
Iro Iand
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Unitcd Kingdom
101.7%
103. 0?(
LO4.y"
102.6,6
94.t%
97.4%
r01.1,6
1or. 3%
98. 9,6
Prellminary draft
304
176
2,195
L,652
57
729
t4
405
1, 152
Table 4
Eff€ct of formulaE l, 2 and 3 on the 1980 budget (in n E[IA)
Belgium
DGnmark
@rmany
Fr!nco
frc Iand
Italy
Luxembourg
Nether land s
United Klngdom
coeff. 1
311
I82
2,272
1.576
55
702
l4
413
1.136
ceff. 2
302
L74
2,225
1,669
57
738
13
403
1,175
coeff. 3 (1+2)
309l8I
2,302
1,694
54
711
14
4r1
1,149
5,694 6,76L 6,756 61 825
r'fft*i4.6f,ni-r,, ,.
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I. Introduction
The present document enrarges upon the chapter of the working party,s
programme entitled 'new rtlourceo' and makes uee of the analyeee of the
financing of the Cornmunity budget provided in the Commiseion,s communlcation
of 21 November 1978.
rn the working party's programme it had becn agreed (see mlnutee
PE 62.658) that the ncw own resources would have to rneet the follor+dng
requi rements :
(a) the totar burden on communlty taxpayers shourd, in principre, not
be increased;
(b) the community's fiscar system must become progresoively fairer;
(c) the princrple of equity must be applied not !o much to the share of
the Corununity budget to be founded by each Member State but to the
type of fiscal burden placed upon Community citizens.
2. GeneraL
The Decislon of 21 April t97O envisages that the Community's buclget
should be financed by own reEources. The expression 'own resources' meanB
revenue of a fiscaL nature belonging once and for aII to the Community as
of right for financing its budget without the need for any aubsequent
decision by national authorities.
As from the 1980 financiaL year, the community's budgct will be flnanced
completely from:
(a) own resources of a cornmercial nature (eustoms dutiee and agrlcultural
levies ) ;
(b) resources of a fiscal nature in the strlct senae of the word (VAT and
taxeE on staff salaries);
(c) resources of a parafiscar nature (coresponsibility levy and sugar
contributions).
The EcSc budget which is separate from the Communlty butlget is rnainly
financed from resources of a parafiscal nature.
when the budgetary procedure for 19zB waE under way, uemberE of
Parliament from various political groupE, had already called the Comnrigaion
and Council's attention to the possibility that the Cornnunity'E orn reaourcea
might be exhaueted in the short term and the need to begin a detalled
examination of the Community's future flscal Eystem aa quickly aB poslible.
_ 7I 
- PE 64.634/rin.
In resPonse to these remarkg and to the financial eEtimates contained
in the three-year forward forecasts for 1979-81 and I98O-82 the commiseion
submitted a communication to the Council and the Ep in which lt stated that3
(a) there ie a real poesibility that the 1% VAT ceiling may be excecdcd
in l98l;
(b) it is essential to find neril sources of revenuei
(c) the additional revenue must be found exclusively from wlthin a range
of taxes which have the fulI character of ovrn reaourcesi
(d) VAT is a good basis for the creation of new revenue eince a ralslng of
the present ceiling would have the advantage of simpllcity;
(e) a study ehould nevertheless be made of the feasibility and most sultable
, 
methods of, introducing progressive elementE into the Community's fiecal
system.
When presenting its opinion on the three-year fonrard forecasts 1979-81
to the council and the Commission, the Economic Policy Comnittee had for lts
part noted that:
'the Commission will preeent a report on neh, own raaourceE for thc
Community'
and stregsed:
'the need for lmmediate and careful conEideration of, this toplc in
view of the time factor and the problems involved in having any
arnendment to the Declsion of 2l eprll 1970 drawn up, diccueaed
and adopted by the Community's inEtitutions and then ratified at
national level'
Furthermore, in the three-year forward financial forecasta for 198O-L982,
the commission emphasized that in 1980 the yield from customs dutlee would
begin to be affected by the tariff reductions decialed wlthln the GATI whlch
are to be staggered over a period of eight yeara. Over the same three'yearB
there would also be a decline in the revenue from agricultural levies.
The Commieaion has put fomard two hypotheseE: (i) that agrlcultural
expenditure (EAGCiF Guarantee Section) might be brought uncler control, In
which case the yield from VAT would etlll cover the totality of budgetary
expenditure in 1982 although the problem would be encountered shortly there-
after; or (ii) an automatic and steady,rise in this expenditure com;nrable
with the gronrth of expenditure since the creation of the conunon agricultural
market. Should thie be the case, the Comniealon hae warned the budtg.trfy
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authorlty that axpendlture wlII inevitably exceecl the maximum yield from
VtrT from 1982 onwarde.
The trend ln agricultural expendlture since the reJection of the draft
budget for 1980 and the presentation of the Gundelach package mlght now
give the impreesion that the danger of own rresourcea proving lncuff,icient
in the ehort term haa been recedtng.
The Commiesion, in itE working paPer on the 'trend in agricultural
expenditure and itE effect on the Community budget' (SEc(80) 419) etates
that thie impresslon would be wrong since the present situation leaues
very little room for manoeuvre. The Commiseion concludeg ln the light of
the consideratlone eet out in this that 'it is clear that the trend in
expenditure 1s neceEeitating ever greater uee of VAT-derieed otrrn resources.
Moreover, the rate of use wiII inevitably riEe towarde the upPer limit,
the 1% ceiling'.
In additlon, it should be emphasizeil that the procedures laid down
for granting the Community further oh,n reaources different f;om thls it
already holde are long and complicated.
3. flvo politica,I premises
The need to tackle the problem of finding more adequate financing
for the Community budget immediatety is confirmed by the conclusions reached
in the working documents drawn uP by Mr BARBI and trlr ARNDT. These
conclusions do moreover accord with the European Parliament's politlcal
pronouncements on'convergence ardbudgetary questions' (resolution of
15.11.L979. - rapporteur: I,{r LANGE) and the rejection of the 1980 draft
budget (resolution of 13. L2.1979. - rapporteur: ur DANKERT).
l.tr Barbi, who startg out from the notion that most Corununity expenditure
is a replacement for national expenditure, acts as a multiplief and encourageE
economieg of sca1e, concludes by etating that the Community's policiee \riIl
only be fully effective once the threshold of 2.5% of the total gfass national
product of the Comrnunity hag been paeeed.
Mr Arndt says that, in oriler to be able to deal with the problems raised
by the development of the Community and the question of fairer participation
in the Comrnunity by the Member States ln terns of their citizen''e contributions,
the VAT ceiling must be raiseil from I% to I.5%ox 2%aad the formula used for
calculating vAT revenue should have built-in progression.
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4. Financial autonopv and thc unltv and comorehenslvcnrre of the budqet
A third politlcal premisc lE that the choice made wlth the Daci.lon of
21 April 1970 to flnance the communtty budget exclualvcly from o*n relourc.t
Is lrreversible. tccordingly, thc Conununity'c lnstltutlonr murt nako lt
thelr taek to aafcAuard the cofiununlty'a fLnanclal autondry rt all tlmcr.
Furthermore, wlth the sole exception of the agrlcultural aector [n
whlch resourc€! ofr paraflgcal nature wlll bc ueed to nttt .pcclflc ltour
of expenditure, thc Community'e instltutlont muet dcuotc thensofucc to
safeguardlng the prlnclplea of the unltv (expendllture Lr dlcrlvodt lrom rcvonuc)
and@(a11revenucandal'1errpcndlturcmuetbccntcred)of
the Commlrnlty'e budgpt.
5. Basic crlterla for financinq ths EE budqet
.
. There are €stentlally tuo wayr ln whlch an adequatc mcdlum-ttrm rolutton
can be found to thc probleru of flnanclng thc corE[unlty'r budgctr
(a) allocatlng to thc conmunlty e partlal or total rttc of ona or noro of
the taxg3 alraadv extrtl,nq In the Itiombcr Statcr;
(b) the crcttlon of onc or morc nGw taxc., lnplylng rn tddltlonll ttrerl
burdcn on qomnunlty cltlzenr.
Today's natlonll flreal eyetem ar€ to corlplcx and nultl-leaotrd that
lt i.c prictlcally. lnporrlblc to ercatc a tax whlch lr dttflorcnt trom thoro
alrcady tn oporttLon except porhapr rome nlnor cxclrc duty rnd hrncr optlon
(b) ..cxlcte only ln theory.
' olrtion (a) horrvcr nould rcqulrc thc progrctrtvo hlrmonlzrtlon ol tho
basig of a.lcarncnt of th. taxGr from whlch e rato wouldt ln whoh or th
plrt b€ tranrforrcd to tho Corrmuntty. Elrlr rhrt war donr to rnebh I thllt
of vAT rev.nu. to b. allocatodl to thG Communtty.
5. I,he ob{cctivm o!,thc comnunltv'r tuturi lkcal .vtt.m
Thc volumc o! thc c6tmunltyr. ourn r.roure.. ln thr rnrdllum-tcrn wlll
bc marglnal ln coqrrtllon wlth natlonal publte apondltun rnd thr ovrrrll
levcl of taxcr rQtrcdl'by thc Mornbar gtat...
I{hen one conrl.dcr. thrt tho total ahount relred by tho liubor gt!t..
in taxatlon todry lr qual to approxlnrtoly 35.6t6 ol thr Corununltyrr totll
gro!! domcrtic prodrrct an6 thet r.v.nl ruthorttlu hrvr lndloetrd th.t 2.3X
of. thlr cDP 1l thc crltlcal thrcrholdl whlch thr iomunlty'r budgtt wtll hrvr
to rcach, lt loIlow. thrt ln thc nrodlun tcrn thc comlunltl,'r llroal trkt wllt
rcach a ftgurc of approxtmrtcly 7% ol thr total enount retrd ln trrcr by thr
lilembsr Strtaa.
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Bearing this in mind it is only realistic to say that in the mediumterm the Community,s fiscal policy will not be in a position to gervesuch objectives as the rediatribution of income, the variation of aggregatedemand or a policy of investment stabilization and incentives which arenormally pursued by national fiscal policy.
The two principal objectives of the Community,s fj.scal syetem forthe time belng would therefore seem to be:
(a) to have availabre the rargest poesibre tax revenue in order to meetthe community's growing financiar reguirernentE over the medium term;(b) to achieve overarr a fairer fiscal syetem for individual communitycitizens and for the citizens of each lt{ember state taken as a group byintroducing strong progressive erements.
7.
There are three:
(i) 
of thoEe taxeE for which a rate wilrbe allocated in whole or in part to the comnunity. This must be done' in accordance with the community procedure arready used for theharmonization of the basis of assessment for vAT.
(tt) 
. This requires a strengthening of theauditing procedurecarried out by the community and closer cooperationbetween national and community fiecal authorities to combat tax evasionand avoidance.
revenue can
wiII act as
of levies,
fn the medium term the collection
continue to be carrl_ed out by the
the Community,s agents _ as thcy
the VAT rate and cuatome duties _.
of
do
(ttt) 
.
Community,s fiscal
Member States which
already in the case
The comrnunity's fiscar system muet also have the folroring basiccharacteri stics :
(a) Community
taxpayer;
(b) comrnunity taxea must be recognized as such by the taxpayer;(c) there must be no ne\{ fiecal bureaucracies;
(d) the harmonized basis of assessment must be ae simpre as,possibre.
taxes must be corrected as far as possibre directry from the
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8. The harnonization of national fiEcal svetems
The convergence of national fiscal systeme is one of the mogt'i..mpottant
stageE in the realization of a genuine connon market and the other obJectlves
whlch the Communlty has set iteelf.
The harmonization of national fiscal syetems has been under constdcratior
by Cornmunity institutions ever since the preeentation of the Neumar*,
Report in February 1963 on the 'fiscal and financial harmontzation of, the
common l,hrket'. The Cornmission later suhnitted fiEcal harmonlzatlon pro-
grammes having particular regard to direct taxation, first in 1967 and then
in 1975.
The European Parliament delivered a detailed opinlon on the baeie cif
the report preaented by l,!r Artzinger on behalf of the Comurlttee on Budgartr
during the 1974-1975 eession on 'the fiscal harmonization of the lEmbcr
StateB' .
Furthermore, the Council of l.tinisterg, in the resolutlon lt adoptcd
in lrlarch 197I on the establishment of Economic and l,bnetary Union, had
already declared that:
'to accele.rate the introduction of the free movement of peraon!2 groupal
eervlceg and capital and the lnterpenetration of the econontcs, thc
Council shall, on a proposal from the ComrnlBsion, declde on an appropriate
package of mcaguras concerning:
- the Cornmunlty ruleE determining the uniform basla of aaBeaoment for
value-added tax in accordance with the Decieion of 21 April 1970;
- 
the harmoaization of the scope and, basls of assesament of and rulee
for levying exciee dutiee and parti'cularly thoge having a elgnificant
effect on trade;
- the harmoni,zation of aorne types of tax which may have a dlrect lnfluqnag
on capital movementE wltttn the comunlty and ln particular thc harrnonlatlon
of the tax arrangements applicable to intereat from flxed-lnterest !€curttl
and dividends;
- further harnonization of the etructure of cffiitrEny taxatlon;
- 
a gradual increase in duty-free allouances for citizene crosaing Cormun'lty
frontiers.
Before the end of the firet phaae, the Council wi-Il examine the etudise
to be carried out in accordance with th"e Conmleaion'a proposala concernlng
the approximation of the rates of value-added tax and excise duticg' .
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The harmonization of national fiscal systemE ie ceasnttal for the
future financing of the Community budget for two reaEons!
I(a) the allocation to the Community of pardl or all of a given rate of
I
national taxes requiree gradual harmonlzation of, thelr bagee of
Esaeasment i I .
(b) the development of the Community'g fi.eJat system in the mcdium tern
reguires: - l
(i) a harmonlzation - not neceesarily abeolute but certainly advlnecd -
of the rates of the national taxes which are In part tranEf,crred
to the Comrnunity;
(ii) in order to prevent dlstortione J.anrn the natlonal fiscal ayetems
(having regard to the fact that the amount raieed in taxation by
the Community must reach at leaet 7% of the total rEieed by the
l{ember States), greater convergence w111 be needed in the relation-
ship between the various types of obligatory palmrenta (taxes and
soeial welfancontributlons) wlthin national fiscal systeme.
Although protracted procedures will have to be follored before these
various factors can be harmonlzed with action having to be taken by the
Community's institutions, polltlcal organizatlons, governmenta, natlonal
civil serviceE and national parliaments, the ultimate objective lE not so
difficult to attain and the emphasis placed on the difficultles is for the
moCt part due to opposition from those who fear that they will lose lnfluence
o:fvested interests and to ways of thinking whlch must alEo be changed.
In fact, although the make-up of tixatton dloes dti.ffer-c-onllderably
from one Member State to another, it ls also true that there. are Eome common
trenda, for exampl-U'the eteady shift away from indirect taxation in favour
of direct taxation.
There ia greater divergence between the Meilber Stateg' arrEngements
governing Eoclal welfaecontributions, but thig is not relevant to the
discussion here.
Finally, it should be borne in mind that, follonlng the DeclEion of
21 April Lg7O, the Corununity'e institutions were able to Etart work on the
harmonization of the basie of asgessment of the most tmportant i.ndirect
- 
-1._tax, VAT, and that this has largely no* been achieved.
)'
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9.
Ttre cteation of new own reaoutrces wtll be a long procolr and therc ir
therefore a need for a short-term proJcct to ansure thc flnanclng of thc
Corununity's budget over the next, f4 years.
The praetical solutions over the ehort tenn, as outlined recently
by the commiesion, are ae follows:
(a) an increase in the rate of vAT rev'enue allocatcd to the comunlty(from 1% to z% or by aborishing the'eeiring). Thta would require
an ancndrent to Articre 4 of the Declelon of, 2L Aprir rgzo by means
of the cornmunlty procedureafor revtaing the Treatles;
(b) widening the range of 'resources of a comnercial nature, (cuetonra
duties and agrieurturar reviea) by introdrucing, for exanpre, a duty
on importe of o11 into the Community or dutieo on tmports of vegeta5lc
oila. This can be done by means of the elnple Corununity procedurc,
i.e. a proposal frorn the Commissi.ool in optolon from the Europsrn
Parllamcnt and a decislon frqn the CounciI.
Solotion (a) (an increase in VAT) would have contidcrablc advantrgoa
and could be ueed for financiar equalizatlon In the lray propoaed by ur Arndt
in his working document. However, vAT doeg not have a proEresgivc effect
which can b€ applied to individuar taxpayers, and the flnancing of the
community budget in the medium terh exclueivcly-from relourcel of a ,conuncrelal
nature and regourceg derived from indtreot taxea alonc could gtve rltc to
consi derable dletortlons.
The only advantage of solution (b) (the introduction of new taxes) is
that it can be introduced more easily by means of a declelon talten by the
community inEtitutions. Nevertheless, a tax on oi,l imports or dutieg on
vegetable oilg ltould both have extremely.negative side-ef,fects which milltatc
against the uee of theee retources for the future flnaneing of the community
budget.
As far as the tax qn enerqv imports is coneerned, the ComraLssion, in
its communication to the Councll on a 'Corilnunity energy lnitLatlvc, (COtt(gO)
l3o final) hae examined the possibility of lntroduclng r communlty tax on
energy to help achieve the overarl objectives of the energy polLcy.
rhe commiasion coneiderg that it would be deairable to:
- adopt a sy8tem which wourd be eimple to adminiBter, wourd create the
fewest political and conatitutional dlfftcultics, and whlch could be
introduced rapidly;
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- minlnize complications with third countries, particularly oil-producing
countries, and thoee wLth which the Community has concluded preferentlal
agreements;
- Erangform the tax into Commqnity own resources, the rgvenue fron which
would go directly to the Community budget.
According to the Commission the main fiEcal inctruments would be:
- either a tex on energy consumption in all its formEi
- or a tax on oil and speciflc o11 producta;
- or a tax on energy productlon in general or just oll production;
- or a customs duty;
- or a levy on energy imports in general or only on oll;
- or a levy on particular oil produeta.
The commission has pronieed to subnlt to thc councll a dlctelled -riudy
of the varioue echemea whtch night poseibly be used to-ralse levenue from
the energy sector.
In it6 comrnunication on 'financing the Community builget' of 21 Novenber
1978, the Commission had previously stated that 'a Comnunlty tax on the
production of energy would not be congistent with the energy policy object-
ives of Etimulating Production'.
The Corumission pointed to the need to take account of economic effectg
of a tax on con6urnption and the grcat clifficultiee of harmonlzini auch a
tax.
The reference to the simpltcity of actmlnistration and the politlcal
and constltutlonal pr.ocedures clearly showe that the Conmiseion favoure a
duty on energy imPorts.
It ie therefore felt that the lntroduetlon of an lmport duty on oll
can be envlsaged so1ely as one element of an overall Communlty energy
policy.
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rurndng to thc clutv on vcqetabLc ol.lg, thr commtcclor notcdl. tn tta
conwwrleatior to thc couneil on 'chang+a ln the co{mon agrlcultural polLcy
to hclp Dttrrnce tho markete and stramlinc aqlcndi,turG, (cou(79) ?IO fttrl)
th{t a more cohetcnt policy on anlmal and vegretable fat! mlgtrt becmrc ncdcrlary,
itarticularly i,n the context of enlarEcment. Thc cornmlcalon fcole thtt thlr
can only be brought about by inpoaing a Ievy on tfegetable fatc ;roduccd in
the Community or inported from third countries.
, 
In order to eneure that thie levy would not be diaerlminatory, would
not require the dlestruction of produce and would be rinple to a&nLnlltGr,
the cormigsion ie tn favour of making thb followtng provigl.onc:
(a) that the levy ahould be applicd to oll ccede and oleagtnoue frult,
both otiginatlng in the comunity and ifiported, ar thGy afc procGa.rd
in prelnration for olive oil productlon;
(b) thrt the'lcvy ahourd be applicd to importodl oilr arrdl frt,r andt lnrportodt
productr contltnlng large amountg of oll., !B thcy 6ntcr the cotnunlty;
(c) that the letry rhould bG fixcd in abrolutc terma onca a y.rr'rnd that
the aane f,igure rhould be atrryItecl to all oilg ancl fatri
(d) that the levy ehould bc refunded wherc thc producc lt exportedt or ulcd
fot purpolca other than hunin consumption.
It chould b€ strongly cnphasized that thi.d type of rcrourec hea the
followlng drawbsckg:
ln a pcriod of gradual llberalizatlon of ttadc, a tariff of thir klndt
wduld strcngthcn the Cmunit,y,a agricultural protectlonlrn;
it would partlcularly harr relatione wLth thG developlng countrl.ee
touerdr rhich th€ cormunity haa agauncd and will aalume lntornatlonal,
i.nter-rGgional tnd bilateral cornmltncnta reEardlng a wldor Conilunlty
prcference for thcir agrleultural cxports;
(c) lt is itloglcal that olive o11 wtrich is already in rlifflculty and
reccivlng rubaldica ehould be cubJectGd to a furthcr tan ihcrcetci
(d) not only sourd thb protcctionlgm of thc cornmuntty,e egricurturll
policy be ctrengthcned, but alco thc Corrnrunlty nl.ght bc forcod to nrkc
signlflcant conceseions ln conlrensdtion to ita tradlng ptrtnerr wlthln
GATT whlch would lncreage their prdtcctionLsn;
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(e) an increaee in the price of margarine and vegetable oils would encourage
a further increase in butter production which would have a harmful
effect, for example, on the heart,h of community citizens since the
consumption of vegetable fats is always preferable to that of animal
'fats.
The conclueion to be drawn from these considerations is that Community
institutions, political organizations and the governments of the Member
statee must immediately (to arlow the objectlve to be attained in the
medium term) tackle the problem of transferring part of the revenue from
existing national direct taxation to the own resourcee of the Community
since this is the onty means of ensuring a high degree of fiscal equity.
The Politlcal hypothesis which the European parliament ought to be
urging the other Comrnunity institutions to accept is that of a progressive
harmonization of the bases of assessment of direct taxes on the income of
natural PersonE, accompanied by an acceleration of the harmonization of
taxes on dividends and company taxation which has been under way for some
time.
This harmonization ie vital if the Community is to
ohrn resource the yield from a Community rate applied
the income of natural persons.
be
to
able to use as
direct taxationan
on
in
of
The process of convergence between national fiscal systems deecribed
section 8 above, wirl arso require 
- in the long term - a rarge meagure
harmonization of the rates of direct taxation on peraons.
Clearly the harmonization of VAT rates and the rates of direct tax-
ation will have an effect on each other since these are the most important
elements of the national fiscal systems.
10. Conclusions
The working party draws the following conclusions from the above
conEiderations:
(a) to aIIow further progreEs towarda Community integration and more
efficient management of the common policies greater acope will have
to be found for financing the Community budget;
(b) the revenue for the Community budget must be drawn exclugively from
a system of genuine oryn reEources i
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(c) the evenue for the Community budget must come from a partial or
total allocation to the community of a given rate of one or more
taxe6 already existing at national level which does not thereby
increage the overall fiscal burden on the taxpayer;
(d) the Community's fiscal system muEt be a falr one both as regardg the
burden on the individual citizen and on the citizens of each l{enbcr
State aE a group (the Arndt proposal);
(e) the Corgrunity,s taxes must be choeen from amongst the taxes exlatlng
at national level providing a sufficiently high yieldl to allow the
financing of the Community budget to meet future developnents;
(f) in the short term there must be a change in the rate of vAT revenue
allocated to the Cornmunity under the Decislon of 21 April 1970;
(S) in the medium ternr there must be: (1) harmonization of the baels of
asoessment for direct taxation on the income of natural pcraona;
(2) the allocation to the community of a given rateoG'these taxeat
(3) harmonlzation of the rates of indirect taxation (vAT) and direct
taxation (natural and legal Persons);
(h) Comnunity taxes must be collected directly from the taxpayer and not
by meana of the 'statiEtical methoil'.
-'B2 - PE 54,534/ttn.
VI.
the dccieion-talsing mehinery for th.e '"
Community's ouin rG ourecs
Draftsman: Mr NORD
il
T
t
Ilr
- 
83 - PE 64.634/fLn. 1
I
(
{
I
i
I.
IMRODUCTION
r' Thls document takes a stage further the ldeas summarlzed ln the chapterof the worklng partyrs programme of work dearlng wlth declslon-taklngnachlnery' Taklng as its startlng point the present Bltuatlon wlth regardto the Corlulunltyrg orrn resources, the docurnent attemptss
(r) to crarlfy the guestlon of the avalrablllty of coumunlty fln reaources,(21 to adapt the rules for the arteration and creatLon of own reaourceEto meet new developments slnce I9ZO,
(3) to set up a new sygtem for regularly revlewlng the Comnunlty,s flnancLngregulrementa.
(a) !!s-ge:s3ueg_:3eple!1es:_98_e*E_resessses
2- slnce the entry rnto force of the corununlty vATr and given the farrryhlgh revel of the latter wlthin the 18 'ceJ.ll.ngr, there has been much talt aboutthe communltyrs qiln reaources runnlng out. some Member stateB conslder thatthls celrlng rePresents the maxlmum frnanclal regourcea. avalrable to theconmunlty' at least ln the foreeeeable future and that lt tlrerefore governathe amount of planned expendlture.
3. The desirablrlty of undertaking new aetlvltres 
- and cven of expandlngexlstlng pollclee 
- hae thus cone to be assesged nore and more on thc barlaof the reEources avalrabre wlthrn the rt celrlng. The council has arrcadydeclded not to undertake certain prlorlty or even urgent measureE 90 aB tQremaln wlthln the celrlng. There ls therefore a rlsk of ttre conununltybecomlng a aort of rLimlted company wlth a share capltal 0f lt of vATr.
Thls concept
an-d the splrlt of
ls totally unacceptable and contrary to both the retterthe Treatles.
(u) rbe-repeE:elgeE:-BsrsEe-98-g9ss!1tr-Elrlg3slss
4' The Treaty asslgns the lnstltutlons a number of obJectlves, the attalnmentof whlch requlres correaPondlng flnanclal resourcea. Hhlre the rerairrr"- ---'-avalrablllty of, such resources may admlttedly lnfruence the rate of progrcsetowards these obJectlves, lt wourd not appear po88rble wlthln the aplrlt ofthe Treatles to arbltrarlly inpose a celllng on resources whlch woulaeffectrvely llmlt any f,urther deveropment of corrmunlty actlvltles.
5' The' flnanclal provlslons of the Treaty, arthough not, partrarry obsorote2,lay down the followlng rules, ' --'- F--
I Partlally ln 1979 and whotly in t9g02 s.. paragraphs 14 to 17 belorr
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- Arttcl€ 199 states that revenue and exPendlture should be ln balance'
- Artlcle 200 speclflee the avallable reBources'
- Artlcle 201 laye down the procedure for crsatLng new resourcGa or altcrlddlt
exlstlng resources,
- Artlcle 203 sets out the rures governlng the adoptlon of the bualgetr 1'e'
declslons on exPendlture.
6. There can be no queetlon of lntroduclng any form of nandatory crlllng on
resourceg I glven thlE machlnery and the fact ttrat the wlrole ComunLty venturs
must necessarlly be evolutlonary ln character'
(c) lle-elgElllssEse-eE-gbe-t!-eE-yaE-lgelllsg'
?. under these clrcumEtance6, how ls the declelon of 21 Aprtl 1970, whlch at
the same tlme aB replactng Menber stateBr contrlbutlons by mn reBouros6
lald down that the rate of, Communlty VAT should not ejrceed 1t' to be lnter-
pteted? 
n ae etther Dermanent or abeolute but rathgr8. fhte llnlt Ehould not be Been s lt  Perm€
as a p@ precedlng the nor:naI operatlon of ttre cotmunlty vAT sy8ten' After
a trlal perlod for this new form of revenue any reBtrlctlonB must ba rcmoved
so that the rate Is left free to fluctuate as requlred'
g.rnpractlcetheBystemoflevylngaProBortionofVATrwhlchshouldhave
been lntroduced from 1 ilanuary 1975 * was applled to all thc l'le$bdr statos
only wlth effect frorn I ilanuary 1980.- AE a reBult the ProportLon of vAE
levled haE from the very outset been ilear the It ltmtt and ttrc trlal Perlod
orlglnaIly planned le ltable to be much shorter than foregecn' Ehlr may laad
some people to conslder flxlng a new rcelllngr (e.g. 2t), and ttrus extendlng
the trlal Perlod.
10. The author does not share thls vlevr, bellevlng tnatead that the otlglnal
schedule should be adhcred to and that once expendlture has fiilrn' ln thi
normal yray to over It, the rdlevant atithortttee should ProPose total abolltlon
of the celllng.
(d) aEelltleg-eE-lbe-I!-selllgg
I1. The Corunl.'lon Ehould''$-9""tot" ln due courao put forward a vcry rlnplr
proposal to annnd the ctectsY[On of 21 Aprl1 1970. lltre anerdment would lnvolve
deletlng fron the second,subparagraph qf Artlcle l(l) ttre worde underllncd
o.'1'
such resources shall lpclude thoEe referred to ln Artlcle 2 and algO
thoEe accrulng frbff'tne value added tax and obtalned by apPlylng t rate
not exceedlnq It to an ."""""^Lrrt basl. whlch lE deterillned in a
unlform manner for l'tenber StateB accordlng to Comunlty rules
.......1
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II.
12. rn addltlon to the above gueati.on of r€aovlng the cclllng on vAT, the
worktng Party as a whole wlll have to declde on whether or not propoeala
should be made to alter the present.Bygtem of orm r€aources or to creetc nctr
redources.
13. Thls workl'ng document merely consLdera whether the procedure lald d61,7nln the Treatles for the .criatlon or alteratlon of guch reEourceE should be
revlewed ln the llght of developnente Elnce I9?0.
( a ) !!s-psei!-ge-ssge!e-a*lslee-3gg-eEg_3gl_eE_!&e_EEE_EEes!r
14. rt ls qulte clear that parta of Artlclee 200 and 201 have become ob6olete
slnce the cffitunlty systern of own resourc€a waa lntroduced by the declElon
of 21 Aprll 1970.
15. Artlcle 200 states that the bu{get revenue shall be flnanced frorn con-
trlbutlong from the llenber stateg aacording to certain scalesl.
16. The ftret paragriph of Artlcle 201 states that thege contrlbutlons
, 
could be repIac.9 by own reeources ln parttcular by revenue accrulng fron
the Compn Cugtoms Tarlff .
17. TheEe tt o artlcles are clearly outdated. Ttrey could ln fact have been
revlsed Ythen the Treatles were amended ln 1975 to Lncreage parl,Lamcntrs
budgetary powers. rt ie no$, esEentlar that they be updated.
(u ) $gglplBs-&bs-sEgssilsge-g9s-gE$tlog-9E-ElleElgg-9Es-Ettgsggse
18. The thlfd 'paragraph' of ArtlcLe 201 lays down the procedure for rcplrcl.ng
national contrlbutlona by own reEourcea. Thls procedure ig algo therefore
appllcable to any alteratlon or creatlon of oryrr reEources slnce 1970.
The procedure provldeE for:
- a cohnlgeion proposal,
- consul,tatlon of the European parlianent,
- unanl.moue declsion by the Councl1,
- ra.tlf lcatl,on by the lrte6er States.
19. The follmlng changee in the respectlve ptrers of ttre coo16unlty lnstltu-
tlons slnce 1975 would appear to JuEtlfy alteratlone to the dac!.sloagnaklng
Proceag:
- slnce 1975 Parllament has becone a budgetary authorlty ln lts oun rlgbt
worklng ln conJunction wlth the Council;
- slnce 1979 Parllanent alone dlrectly representir all the cltlzeng, and hence
all the taxpayersrof the Conmunltyl
I th. scales refer only to the slx orlglnal ltember States (eee Annex f)
' 
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- as from 19go the budtget has been entirely flnanced by reiorrrces ralged
dlrectlY bY the Cotnnunlty
20.Itwouldthereforeseemthatthe'ratl.flcatlon'ofCounclldeclrlonson
olirn resourcel should hencef,orth be a natter not for the lrtenber statcl but 
f,or
theEuropeanParllament.Indeed,tnlgT3theConurrisglondrewupproposals
for revlsrng the Treattesl along. thege lInes. It ProPoBed the followlng
procedure for the alteratlon or creqtlon of q'in leBourcest t
- Conunlssion ProP'osa1 ,
- unanLnous agreenent of the Councll'
-deciElonbyParllanrentbyamaJorltyofnenberEandthrge-ftfthgofthe
votes cast.
2l.fhlsproposalY,asneverconslderedbyttreCouncil,whlchclalmedttrattlre
problem of the establlshment of neg, regourceB waB not of lnm€dlate concerni
the councll dld however concede that th18 amendrnent ralsed a problgtt 
whlch
courd be examrn*-i.a"t'. The proposed revlalon ls therefore 
gt111 on tlrc
table and could be re-actlvated by Parllament'
22.Tt.shouldbepolntedoutthatrenovalofthenecdforrattflcatlonby
the trlenber stateE doea not fundamentally alter the pollttcal balance ae 
the
agreement of each l,lernlcer state (by unanlmouB vote ln the councll) lc stllI
regulred to create or alter own resourcea' Removal of ttre need for ratlflca-
tlon by Mernber State' would hmever do away wlth t-}1e lengthy delaye 
(two to
three yearl) requlred for approval by natlonal Parllamonts'
(c)!pp!!9el1eg-gE-lEe-eseggeg-9egls19!=EgElEg-PE999ggIe-99-!be-gggEglgg
eE 
-eEeltsEleg-tbe-selllsg-es-ygE
23. Could the declglon-maklng procedure be revlsed - by meang of amendment 
of
the Treatles - before any declslon to remove ttre calllng on vAT? trhLE 
wourd
obvlously depend on hd, preaelng the latter problem becann, namely on.hgtr
soontheannualrateofVATreachedtheltcelllng.Thlslsstlllunclear.
24.:Ifltbecanen€ceaBarytodecldetoabollshthecelllngonVATbefore
the Treatles T,ere revleed, such a declElon should obvloualy be taken 
only
afterdetalledconeultatlonbetweentheParll.anentandtheCorrncll.
25.Inaddltlontotheremova!.ofthecelllngonorynre3Grrccsandrevl'elon
of the decl.elon.naklng procedures, there would Eeem to be a need for cffectlve
forwardplannlngofthefuturePatternoftheflnanclngrgqulrcngntg.l.c.
theresources-oftheComrnunltyoverathreetoflv€-ycattln.BcaI€.
1 s"" Annex rr
2 s". ooc. 2L3/74
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26. 'such pt*rmtAg *Jura fulflL two obJectlves:
provlslon of the fulleat posclble lnformatlon for the budEetary authorlty
on the medlrrnlterm grohrth pattern of'the varlouE own retourcee ln the
Ilght of econonlc and cmnerclal derieloFmante;
a detailed revlew at regrular lnterval.e of the operatlon of the uhirlc tysta
of own resourcea.
(a) Studv of the future pattern of own roeourcea
27..Glven the now Eubstantlal volune of Corurunlty rcaources, thtre wouldl.tes
to be a need for a more detalled and Bystematfc nEthod of fomrd plarmtni of
the future lrattern of the varlous res'ourceg so that the budget-ary authorlty
ls kept better lnf,ormed of the nedlum-tenr flnanclnE poaslbllltlee for
Communlty actlvlttes.
28. This exerclee would 1nv61ve eBtlmatlng as accirately aa posllblc
the future pattern of trade-llnked resourcee (levlee and cuctors duttee)
ln the llght of foredcearble develoSmbntc ln prlc€a, cuBtolts tartffs, the
trade cycle, etc.
the future aaBeBBtEnt basls for Cormruntty VAII - and hence the 1tlcld of tlre
Cormunlty rate - ag lnfluenced by general econdmic actlvlty and lnflatlon,
the future pattebn of all Cornmunlty oyrn reiources cq[pared to the reapec-
tlve GNP and budgete of the lrtenber St'ateg.
29. Plannlng could cover a three-year perlod and be rolled f,orverd each
year. A slrnllar syaten already exists. for expendlture ln the form of, the
trlennlal estlmates drawn up by the ComlssLon each year when preparlng
the prellmLnary draft budget.
Thls system could elroply be extendih to cover revenue as well.
30. These forecasts wou1d, however, have to be kept.BeParate from the budget
procedure ltself and Ehould be mAde ln conJunction wlth the tCornprchenetve
revlew of budget problemsr whlch l.s carrled out separately at the beglnnLng
of each flnanclal y."tl.
31. Parllarnent muet be fully involved ln,botlr the oqrendlture and rgvCnue
aspect8 of thle exercLge ln lts capacity as budgetaqi'authortty ln Lts orn
rlght.
32. It ls clear that thls resource plannlng - llke the trlennlal flnanclal
estlmates themgelves - can have no more than lndlcatlve value and be
lntended solely for the lnformatlon of the budgetary authorlty.
^ Everlr year slnce L976, the CormlEslon hae prepared a docunent entltled
'comlrEtrenclvenv,Lew 6f tne Comunlty's budget problemer. This docun€nt
sumnirlzee the econmlc and budgetary sltuatlon whlch 1s ltkely to preval.lIn the folI<xitng flnancLal year. It ls submltted ln Aprl1 to a_Jolnt_Councll (Forelgi and Flnance tllnlstera). The document 1g also forrardedto the Parllament whlch may prepare a report but whlch doeB not dLscuse ltdlrectlf wlth the Councll
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t b ) Perlegle- gcyles-gE-lEe-srslgB-9E-9sg-r9g9sE9E9
33. In the abovernentloned Bropoael for the revlslon gf Af.tlcle 201, the
Commlsslon suggested lncluding the follorlng paragraphz
rAt least every flve yeare the Councll, after recelvlng a report from
the CommlsElon and sonsultlng the Aesemblyr'shall exanlne whetJrer
and ln what manner new resources ehould be 'created.ll
34. The worklng Party ehould fo116w uP thts ldea but lnterPret tt more
broadly. fhe revlew proposed by the CoraLsELon should take the f,om of a
sort'of general asaessment of th6 current System of own resources' v16wed
from the polnt of vtew of lts effectlvenese and relevance to ttle Present
sttuatLon. nhis aBaeEBment ehould be made by the budtEetary authorltY on'the
baels of a report drawn uP by the ComLgglon and, poeelbly, ttre €ourt of :
Audltors. It 18 es8entlal that the !{ernlcer StateE should be dlrectl'y
lnvolved ln thls through epecially appoJ.nted repreientatlves' It rould
seem advleable therefore for the Corununity and natlonal authorl'tleg to
Jolntly revlew the general sltuation of Comrrunlty f,t'nances every flve ycare
wlth- a vlew to reachlng at regular lntervals eome klnd of general conlcnsua
on the future develolment and allocatlon of the flnanclal costs lmpllclt 1n
further Cottmuntty lntegratlon.
35. Any changes to the exletlng EyEtem whlch were felt to be necgtaaly
followlng thls revlew could be lntroduced ln accQrdance wtth the deelglon-
naklng procedufe descrlbed above.
CONCLUSIONS
36. After conslderlng the varloug agpectg of the declElon-rnaklng nachlnery
ln the fteld of own regources the workLng Party may reach the followlng
concluslone:
( r ) BeB9yel-9!-See!r1gt19E9-98-!be-gs!c-eE-9esge1!I-yAE s . on€e ;'tbc
proportlon of VAT reachee the It.celllng, the declelon of 2I Aptll 1970 shotildt
be amended to move any referenee to cetlLnge. Th" ComrLrElon ls agkOd to nalse
the relevant ProPosals 1n due course.
( z ) llssgss-le-ghe-lleslgles:EgElsg-prgseeg-EeE-lEE-sseetleslellesgllgs
gE-gg!-ECgggfgggs Artlc1eo 200 and 201 of, the Treaty ahouldt be uPdated
stlpulatlng agreement of Eurolrean Parllanent votlng by guallflccl maJOrlty
rather than ratlflcatlon by ttre Merntcer States for any declglon to crcate or
alter own reaourceE. The Conml.eslon Iq asked to make appropriate prOlnaalr
as soon as Poeslble.
I s." Annex rr
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{r) !lgut!ps-gss.Ers{s4ls;gslss-st-tb9-fggsge-E!!!tsB-ef-st8-E!l#!sstg'
The future patterir of o*rr reeourceB niuit be takcn Lnto account when the
trlcnnlrl flnanclal GsttdrteB are being prepared and be consldcred Jolntly
py the budgetary authority bofore the annual ptoccdure for adoptlng thc
budget. Every fivc yeart the Coffiuillty ird ,ratlonal authorltlda Bhould
revlcw the genetal aystdn of on resourcCa rltlr a vlaw to arrlvlng at a
conaensug on thc Cortnnttyre flnanclng nnedr, aapaclty and irethods.
lnnexes
\
1(
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AIINEX I
TINAIICIAL PROVTSTONS OF THE EEC TREATY
As!lglc-122
AII lteme of revenue and expenditure of the Communlty, lncludlng those
relatlng to the European Social Fund, shall be included in estlmates to be
drawn up for each flnanclal year and shall be shown ln the budget.
The revenue and expenditure shown ln the budlget shall be ln balance
4r!lsle-3qg
1. The budget revenue shall include, irrespective of any other revenue,
flnanclal contrlbutlons of l,lember States on the following scale:
Belglum
Germany
France
ItaIy
Belglum
Germany
France
Italy,
7.9
28
28
28
0.2
7.9
8.8
32
32
20
0.2
7
Luxembourg
Netherlands
2. The flnanclaL contrlbutlons of Member States to cover the expendlture
of the European Social Fund, however shall be determlned on the followlng
scale r
Luxembourg
Netherlands
3. The scales may be modtfted by the Councll, acllng unanlmouely.
Ar!igIc-?91
The Commlsslon shall examine the condltlons under whlch the flnanclal
contrlbutlons of Member States provtded for ln Artlcle 200 could be replaced
by the Cornmunlty's own resources, In partlcular by revenue accruLng fron the
common customs tarlff when it has been ftnally lntroduced.
To thls end, the Comnlsslon shall Eubrnit proposals to the Councll.
After consulting the Assembly on these proposals the Councll may, actlng
unanimously, Iay down the appropriate provlsions, whlch lt shall recommend to
the Member States for adoption ln accordance with thelr respectlve constl-
tutlonal regulrements. pE .,64.634/fLn.
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EGINE( II
cllo{rssroN PRoPosAiL (1973)
ON STBENGTHENING-THE BUDGETARY RS{ERS OF PERIJTA}IENT
(Doc. 1000 final)
Artlcle 201 of the Treaty establishing ttre European Economlc Comnunlty
to reads
'The Commlaelon shall exanlne in what manner nev, regources may be
allocated to the ConununLties.
At least every fJ.ve years the Councll, after recetving a rePort from the
Commlsston and consultlng the Assembly, shall exanine whether and ln what
manner new reaources should be created.
enaproposal from the Corunisslon and after unanlmous agreernent ln the
Councllrthe Assembly, votlng by'a majorlty of lts members and three-
flfthe of the votes caat, may change the exlatlng ceillng on own rcsouroe8
or create ne$r reaources. I
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